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Unvested: How Equity and the Deferred 
Payment Gamble in Startups 
Shortchange Employees Targeted by 
Discrimination 
KATIE BLACK* 
The new American Dream is not limited to Silicon Val-
ley. Startups span the nation. They exist in a vast array of 
sizes and ideologies. Nonetheless, by their very nature, 
startups are boundary-pushing enterprises. For all the 
world-altering good they can do, sometimes, that crashing-
into-walls mentality comes at the price of pushing human 
and legal boundaries as well. While the entity tries to grow 
and create, almost hydraulically using what little human and 
financial capital it may have to build the once-impossible, 
startup employees can be left to bear the cost when it is their 
boundaries that are broken. Discrimination is one such cost. 
Current federal and state antidiscrimination law frame-
works reflect a legal landscape perilously out of sync with 
the reality that startups are now entirely commonplace. 
While startups may sometimes literally be small businesses, 
they can have far outsized economic and human effects. This 
Note will analyze how current antidiscrimination law frame-
works too often inherently fail employees suffering discrim-
ination at smaller startups—irrespective of that startup’s 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2015, Uni-
versity of Miami; software engineer; startup has-been. This Note could not have 
been written to completion without the encouragement and help of David 
Stuzin—editor extraordinaire and fellow startup has-been. Further, I would like 
to thank Hannah Gordon, Jose M. Espinosa, Savannah Padgett, and Professor 
Shara Pelz for their incredible support and guidance throughout the process of 
writing this Note. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their un-
ending reassurance and patience. 
302 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:301 
 
age, purpose, or capitalization. Further, this Note will ad-
dress the necessity of reforming Title VII and other antidis-
crimination laws to catch them up with the speed at which 
startups have brushed them aside. In short, ready or not, the 
law must adapt. 
The phrase, “done is better than perfect,” has long be-
come a somewhat dogmatic maxim taught to most program-
mers—myself included. This ideology holds some merit 
when it comes to productivity sprints, hackathons, and get-
ting a product to market. However, the danger of this credo 
arises when it is applied to people and the relationships 
among them—when the uncompromising push to “done,” 
and the culture it entails, comes at the expense of those who 
get it there. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“We have a saying: ‘Move fast and break things.’ The idea is 
that if you never break anything, you’re probably not moving fast 
enough.”1 This creed, articulated over a decade ago2 by Mark Zuck-
erberg, may no longer be Facebook’s rallying cry,3 but the sentiment 
has long since left an indelible scar. 
Breaking things is not necessarily bad. Often, we need a good 
shake-up to draw us from our reverie and propel us forward in the 
spirit of innovation and inspiration. Such a jolt is sometimes one of 
the only forces that can jar loose new ideas and businesses that will, 
as phrased in the iconic 1997 Apple commercial, “push the human 
race forward.”4 Whether society believes them to be fools or he-
roes—or potentially even villains—entrepreneurs and the busi-
nesses they build are unquestionably critical to the economy.5 
Startup companies, in particular, are known for their innovative and 
disruptive impact on the economy—perfectly adaptable to estab-
lished tech centers or war-torn nations, and workable whether boot-
strapped from nothing or well-funded by venture capitalists.6 
The innovation of entrepreneurship itself is relatively incalcula-
ble by most normal economic standards, which preserve quantifia-
ble ideals such as “perfect information” and “perfect competition.”7 
This is because entrepreneurship requires corresponding inventive 
 
 1 Mark Zuckerberg’s Letter to Investors: ‘The Hacker Way’, WIRED (Feb. 1, 
2012, 6:35 PM), https://wired.com/2012/02/zuck-letter/. 
 2 See Henry Blodget, Mark Zuckerberg on Innovation, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 
1, 2009, 4:36 PM), https://businessinsider.com/mark-zuckerberg-innovation-
2009-10. 
 3 See Nick Statt, Zuckerberg: ‘Move fast and break things’ isn’t how Face-
book operates anymore, CNET (Apr. 30, 2014, 10:30 AM), https://cnet.com/
news/zuckerberg-move-fast-and-break-things-isnt-how-we-operate-anymore/. 
 4 Apple, The Crazy Ones, YOUTUBE (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmqH1cWIMVY (uploaded by Historyv-
sHollywood titled “Apple Steve Jobs The Crazy Ones Commercial – 1997”). 
 5 STEPHEN F. REED & ESTHER S. BARRON, ENTREPRENEURSHIP LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1–2 (13th ed. 2013). 
 6 See Ahmad Fahim Didar, Role of Startups in Economic Prosperity, 
STARTUP GRIND, https://startupgrind.com/blog/role-of-startups-in-economic-
prosperity/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
 7 David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
283, 288–89 (2008). 
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ways of creating change, building markets, and bringing people to-
gether to ensure the success of a venture in an environment built on 
the tantalizing uncertainty of solving seemingly unconquerable 
problems.8 That is to say, nothing about building an entrepreneurial 
venture is “perfect”—the unquantifiable nature of the impossible is 
part of the fun. However difficult to fathom, the sheer socioeco-
nomic importance of entrepreneurship and its culture of innovation 
leads to a societal reimagining of laws and legal relationships to help 
these new inventions come to life.9 
In this reimagining of laws, practices, and relationships, “new” 
sometimes means neither better, nor worse. Often this interpretation 
depends on the vantage point and data that factors into the analysis. 
For instance, Airbnb’s website displays an entire analysis of its eco-
nomic impact on the communities in which it operates—touting, 
among other things, that fifty-three percent of its hosts, of which 
fifty-two percent reported being low-income, indicated that the rev-
enue they earned from Airbnb enabled them to stay in their homes.10 
For Airbnb and stakeholders who view Airbnb’s mission as aligned 
with theirs, this reimagining of the status quo within the hotel and 
travel industries impacts communities for the better by providing 
homeowners with a new revenue stream.11 Yet, there are genuine 
pitfalls to this reimagining for those very same homeowners—such 
as the negative effects of short-term rentals on long-term housing 
 
 8 See id. at 290–91 (discussing advancing theories by economists like Joseph 
Schumpeter on entrepreneurship as “developing the idea of the entrepreneur as 
innovator, forcing major structural changes across markets and industries in a pro-
cess of ‘creative destruction’ vital for sustaining a dynamic economy and long-
run economic growth.”); see ERIC RIES, THE LEAN STARTUP 27 (2011) (defining 
a startup as “a human institution designed to create a new product or service under 
conditions of extreme uncertainty” and noting that this definition “says nothing 
about the size of the company, the industry, or the sector of the economy.”); see 
also id. at 22 (“Startups also have a true north, a destination in mind: creating a 
thriving and world-changing business.”). 
 9 Steven H. Hobbs, Entrepreneurship and Law: Accessing the Power of the 
Creative Impulse, 4 ENTREPRENEURSHIP BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (2009). 
 10 The Economic Impacts of Home Sharing in Cities Around the World, 
AIRBNB [hereinafter Airbnb Impacts], https://airbnb.com/economic-impact 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20191214143743/https://www.airbnb.ca/eco-
nomic-impact?locale=en] (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
 11 See id. 
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availability, decreasing the supply and increasing the costs of long-
term housing.12 
In other cases, however, rapid and unchecked creative destruc-
tion13 of laws and norms can be unquestionably harmful—if not al-
together dangerous—to society in general and, frequently, to start-
up employees. Take, for example, the case study of gaming com-
pany Zynga’s initial public offering (“IPO”), wherein management, 
wanting to regain some of the stock options promised to employees, 
clawed back already-allocated, albeit not entirely-vested,14 grants of 
equity.15 Despite its legality under at-will employment and contract 
 
 12 JOSH BIVENS, THE ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AIRBNB: NO 
REASON FOR LOCAL POLICYMAKERS TO LET AIRBNB BYPASS TAX OR 
REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS 4, https://www.epi.org/publication/the-economic-
costs-and-benefits-of-airbnb-no-reason-for-local-policymakers-to-let-airbnb-by-
pass-tax-or-regulatory-obligations/ (last updated Mar. 26, 2019) (“The single big-
gest potential cost imposed by Airbnb comes in the form of higher housing costs 
for city residents if enough properties are converted from long-term housing to 
short-term accommodations.”). 
 13 Vijay Raju, Creative destruction or destructive creation?, WORLD ECON. 
F. (May 5, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/creative-destruc-
tion-or-destructive-creation/ (describing economist Joseph Schumpeter’s inven-
tion of phrase “‘creative destruction’” as “the premise in which new innovations 
destroy established enterprises and create new markets.”); see Sharon Reier, Half 
a Century Later, Economist’s ‘Creative Destruction’ Theory is Apt for the Inter-
net Age: Schumpeter: The Prophet of Bust and Boom, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2000), 
https://nytimes.com/2000/06/10/your-money/IHT-half-a-century-later-
economists-creative-destruction-theory-is.html (describing applicability and ac-
tualization of Schumpeter’s theory to current age of startups, including that 
“Schumpeter saw the entrepreneur as the cornerstone of capitalism.”). 
 14 See REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228 (“Stock options typically are 
‘granted’ (given) to the worker but cannot be exercised right away. Instead, they 
‘vest’ (become exercisable) over time or upon the achievement of certain goals.”); 
see James Linfield, Founder Basics: Founder’s Stock, Vesting and Founder De-
partures, COOLEYGO, https://www.cooleygo.com/founder-basics-founders-
stock/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (describing vesting in that “[u]nder a typical 
vesting schedule, the stock vests in monthly or quarterly increments over four 
years,” including that “[t]here is often a one year ‘cliff’, meaning that the individ-
ual must be with the company for a year to vest the first increment.”). 
 15 Justin Scheck & Shayndi Raice, Zynga Leans on Some Workers to Surren-
der Pre-IPO Shares, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424052970204621904577018373223480802. 
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doctrines,16 this bad-faith practice “erode[s] a central pillar of Sili-
con Valley culture, in which start-ups with limited cash and a risk 
of failure dangle the possibility of stock riches in order to lure tal-
ent.”17 An even more jarring example of dangerous creative destruc-
tion has been Facebook’s decision to hire third-party moderators to 
screen videos and other posts for content that violate its community 
standards.18 This practice exposed many of these moderators to 
posts containing, among other things, murder, other heinous crimes, 
and radicalizing extremism, which caused many moderators to suf-
fer symptoms identical to post-traumatic stress disorder19 or the 
even more pervasive20 reality of rampant discrimination, which is of 
particular concern in this Note. 
As Eric Ries describes in his bestselling book, The Lean Startup, 
Entrepreneurs are rightly wary of implementing tra-
ditional management practices early on in a startup, 
afraid that they will invite bureaucracy or stifle 
 
 16 Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback: Shoring Up the Central Pillar of 
Innovation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 580 (2013). 
 17 Scheck & Raice, supra note 15. 
 18 See Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor: The Secret Lives of Facebook Mod-
erators in America, VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-content-moderator-interviews-trauma-
working-conditions-arizona; see Scott Simon & Emma Bowman, Propaganda, 
Hate Speech, Violence: The Working Lives of Facebook’s Content Moderators, 
NPR (Mar. 2, 2019, 8:23 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/02/699663284/the-
working-lives-of-facebooks-content-moderators. 
 19 Newton, supra note 18; see Simon & Bowman, supra note 18. 
 20 Ina Fried, Silicon Valley’s Quieter Discrimination Fight, AXIOS (May 29, 
2018), https://www.axios.com/ageism-tech-industry-silicon-valley-intel-
00be0045-c52a-4485-a64b-0c6238fee40c.html (describing an EEOC investiga-
tion into Intel as a proxy for “Silicon Valley [having] a love affair with young 
founders.”); Lydia Dishman, 60% of Women in Silicon Valley Have Been Sexually 
Harassed, FASTCOMPANY (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/
3055395/60-of-women-in-silicon-valley-have-been-sexually-harassed (describ-
ing statistics on and specific incidences of sexual harassment in Silicon Valley); 
see Jordyn Holman, Silicon Valley is Using Trade Secrets to Hide Its Race Prob-
lem, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-13/sili-
con-valley-is-using-trade-secrets-to-hide-its-race-problem (last updated Feb. 15, 
2019, 2:58 AM) (analyzing how companies hide required reporting on hiring of 
people of color and women and avoid providing statistics to EEOC, which would 
likely show a lack of diversity in their workforce). 
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creativity. . . . As a result, many entrepreneurs take a 
“just do it” attitude, avoiding all forms of manage-
ment, process, and discipline. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach leads to chaos more often than it does to suc-
cess.21 
Startups eschewing traditional roles like human resources or 
management oversight22 culminates time and again in rampant dis-
crimination on the basis of race,23 age,24 and sex.25 This does not 
mean that startups inherently intend to engage in discrimination, but 
instead, it is a repeated consequence of a general lack of care for 
traditional business and legal norms that exist for a reason. These 
traditional norms are guided by protections that have long been cod-
ified in federal antidiscrimination laws like Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”).26 
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), the agency that enforces these laws, has stated that no 
agreement—not even a severance agreement containing a waiver or 
release of all claims—can preclude an employee from seeking pro-
tection from discrimination under federal antidiscrimination laws.27 
 
 21 RIES, supra note 8, at 15. 
 22 Julianne Teveten, HR Comes Last at Startups and Women Pay the Price, 
VICE (Apr. 21, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://vice.com/en_us/article/z43wdx/hr-comes-
last-at-startups-and-women-pay-the-price (describing how employees at a com-
pany felt that HR issues caused employees to take themselves “too seriously,” and 
how rapid and uneven growth that is characteristic of startups often leaves em-
ployees without organization, which can “[blur] the boundaries between profes-
sional life and social life.”); Cale Guthrie Weissman, The Future of HR and Why 
Startups Shouldn’t Reject It, FASTCOMPANY (May 10, 2016), https://www.fast-
company.com/3059673/the-future-of-hr-and-why-startups-shouldnt-reject-it 
(commenting on startups’ belief that “‘HR is dead’” and decline in belief in startup 
circles that HR is required). 
 23 See Holman, supra note 20. 
 24 See Fried, supra note 20. 
 25 See Dishman, supra note 20. 
 26 See Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/laws-enforced-eeoc (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
 27 Q&A-Understanding Waivers of Discrimination Claims in Employee Sev-
erance Agreements, EEOC (Apr. 15, 2009), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
qanda_severance-agreements.html. 
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But these laws apply only under specific circumstances. Title VII, 
for instance, applies only if a company has over fifteen people, and 
the ADEA only applies if there are over twenty.28 While some states 
have passed separate and stronger antidiscrimination protections for 
workers,29 the scope of federal antidiscrimination protection is not 
ubiquitous. 
While this leaves several issues to explore, this Note will pri-
marily analyze the following: closing the gap in federal antidiscrim-
ination law and the way startups are uniquely reshaping the tradi-
tional legal landscape, specifically within employment law. Moreo-
ver, this Note will explore the impact on employee compensation, 
namely equity, when employees are forced to resign due to discrim-
ination in companies that are not under the purview of federal anti-
discrimination law. This Note places specific focus on discrimina-
tion and recovery recourse under Title VII, as well as what legal 
recourse startup employees can seek outside of its protections. But, 
to understand the full effect of this inquiry, it is necessary to first 
understand the elements of startup culture that are vulnerable to vi-
olations of federal antidiscrimination laws like Title VII. Part I pro-
vides a brief primer on the uniqueness of both working in and being 
paid by a startup. Subsequently, Part II discusses the backdrop 
against which discrimination occurs in more detail, along with its 
contemporaneous and future relevancy to the legal community. Part 
III will then analyze federal antidiscrimination law in detail and il-
lustrate how employees can seek recovery when protected under 
these laws in accordance with the agreements and payment structure 
outlined in Part I. Further, Part IV will provide an inquiry into what 
can be done in the absence of codified recourse: that is, when federal 
antidiscrimination laws do not apply and employees encounter far 
more difficulty attempting to state a claim. Finally, the Conclusion 
will provide suggestions as to how to solve these emerging problems 
within employment law. 
 
 28 Small Business Requirements, EEOC [hereinafter EEOC Small Business 
Requirements], https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/smallbusiness/requirements
.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
 29 Id. 
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A wall at Facebook’s headquarters used to be painted with the 
phrase “[d]one is better than perfect.”30 It has long become a some-
what dogmatic maxim taught to most programmers—myself in-
cluded. This ideology holds some merit when it comes to productiv-
ity sprints, hackathons, and getting a product to market. However, 
the danger of this ideology arises when it is applied to people and 
the relationships among them—when the dogmatic push to “done,” 
and the culture it entails, comes at the expense of those who get it 
there. 
That being said, however, purely describing startup culture in 
this Note will only ever be so effective. To better tell this startup 
story, I want to introduce a narrative element in the form of a hypo-
thetical. With everything that has so far been described in mind, im-
agine for a moment that Alex is a software engineer at a small startup 
of eleven people. Alex is twenty-two and has worked for the startup 
for ten months. Over the past several months, Alex has been stalked 
and otherwise harassed by a coworker, including repeated incidents 
at work, and no longer feels safe working at the company. Although 
Alex’s employer was informed, nothing has substantially changed, 
and Alex feels there is no other recourse but to resign in the interest 
of safety. 
I. THE BACKGROUND: A DAY-IN-THE-LIFE OF GETTING PAID 
BY AND WORKING IN A STARTUP 
A. Equity and the Pervasive Deferred Payment Gamble 
Funding innovation is expensive. With cash at a premium, 
startups often look to equity compensation31 to conserve liquidity 
 
 30 Martin Lindstrom, The Truth About Being “Done” Versus Being “Per-
fect”, FASTCOMPANY (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.fastcompany.com
/3001533/truth-about-being-done-versus-being-perfect. 
 31 See Erik Lie & Tingting Que, On the Use of Option Grants as a Retention 
Tool 1, 4 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3504794 (“[T]he inclination to use op-
tions is more prominent among firms with employees who are at high risk of 
transferring proprietary intellectual capital.”); Erik Lie & Tingting Que, On the 
Use of Option Grants as a Retention Tool, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG 
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/01/16/on-the-use-of-
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while still attracting talent.32 Offering equity in the company in lieu 
of cash, or the opportunity to purchase equity in the future in lieu of 
cash in the present, are, therefore, commonly-used tools in startup 
employment contracts.33 Although there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
model34 for how startups compensate their employees with equity,35 
pervasive in startup ideology is the belief that they should attract and 
hire those employees who want equity compensation36 because such 
employees will “sacrifice the higher cash salary and security of more 
established companies.”37 
 
option-grants-as-a-retention-tool/; Amelia Friedman, 7 Compensation Strategies 
for Cash-Strapped Startups, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 12, 2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/07/7-compensation-strategies-for-cash-strapped-startups. 
 32 Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death – The Role of Com-
petition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 265, 
274 (2006); see REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228 (“New ventures need to be 
creative in recruitment strategies in order to attract and retain top talent while re-
serving as much cash as possible to build and grow the business.”); Meghan Cas-
serly, Understanding Employee Equity: Every Startup’s Secret Weapon, FORBES 
(Mar. 8, 2013, 5:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/
2013/03/08/understanding-employee-equity-bill-harris-sxsw/ (commenting on an 
interview at SXSW with former CEO of PayPal, Bill Harris, that stock options are 
“every early stage startup’s very best friend” in that they require no cash expendi-
ture). 
 33 See Booth, supra note 32, at 273. 
 34 David S. Rose, How Much Equity Should You Offer Your Startup’s Team 
Members?, GUST LAUNCH (Aug. 31, 2018), https://gust.com/launch/blog/how-
much-equity-should-you-offer-your-startup-team-members (“Because each 
startup is different, and each person joins a different situation, there are no one-
size-fits-all rules.”). 
 35 Professor Booth explains as follows: 
[E]quity compensation may take several different forms, rang-
ing from outright grants of stock to grants of stock options at 
the current market price. . . . Or [the company] might pay the 
employee with an option whose strike price is equal to the mar-
ket price (or value) of the stock on the date of the grant. . . . Or 
it may grant stock that vests only after some delay. . . . 
Booth, supra note 32, at 271. 
 36 Casserly, supra note 32 (“‘The people you want to attract to your business 
are the people who want equity,’ [Bill Harris, former CEO of PayPal,] says. ‘You 
need people who are willing to take risks.’”). 
 37 Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 1737, 1750 (1994); see Smith, supra note 16, at 607 (“Startups compensate 
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Despite the lack of a one-size-fits-all method for giving out eq-
uity, it commonly fits two general forms, either “outright grants of 
stock” or “grants of stock options at the current market price.”38 This 
equity, however granted, has value upon transference to the em-
ployee.39 For an outright grant, the value of the equity is measured 
by its market value at the time of issuance.40 For an option, which 
provides the employee with the ability to purchase equity in the 
company at a later time, its inherent value is relative to the time of 
purchase by or transference to the employee.41 Stock options mani-
fest as the ability to purchase shares of the company at a later date 
for its current price; this means that, if the value of the shares in-
crease, employees can purchase higher market-valued shares at a 
lower price.42 The most common of these forms is the stock option 
grant.43 It is important to note that, for startups, giving equity is more 
than just a method of supplementary payment; it is, perhaps most 
importantly, an effective litmus test to attract and hire employees 
who are interested in investing themselves in the company and in 
advancing the startup’s vision and core values.44 In short, equity 
payments are symbolic of the glue that holds a startup together. As 
Eric Ries states in The Lean Startup, “We often lose sight of the fact 
that a startup is not just about a product, a technological 
 
employees by combining lower salaries than they could get at more established 
companies with substantial stock option grants. These stock options must be val-
uable to employees because they accept them as reasons to turn down larger cash 
offers.”); REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228 (“[O]ffering equity compensation 
is an attractive way of supplementing leaner salaries.”). 
 38 Booth, supra note 32, at 271. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See id. at 271–72. 
 42 REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228; see Booth, supra note 32, at 272 
(“The value of a stock option depends on the value of the underlying equity.”); 
see Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Lia-
bilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 638 (1973) (“In general, it seems clear that the 
higher the price of the stock, the greater the value of the option.”). 
 43 See REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228. 
 44 Kyrstal Barghelame, Here’s How Startup Founders Should Offer Em-
ployee Equity, GUSTO (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.gusto.com/blog/hir-
ing/startup-founders-employee-equity (“The stock options you offer to employees 
aren’t just a bunch of percentages and numbers; They’re a reflection of your com-
pany’s values and philosophies.”). 
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breakthrough, or even a brilliant idea. A startup is greater than the 
sum of its parts; it is an acutely human enterprise.”45 
This cash sacrifice for equity inherently creates a deferred pay-
off gamble—often literally referred to as a “lottery ticket.”46 One of 
the reasons that entrepreneurship is so economically incalculable or 
inestimable47 is because its fundamental principles, such as the de-
cision to invest in this lottery ticket-equity gamble, are entirely con-
trary to the common economic ideology that people are risk averse 
at their core.48 Nevertheless, startups and the entrepreneurs that cre-
ate them thrive on the edge of uncertainty in the throes of creative 
destruction and innovation.49 It comes as no surprise, then, that in 
keeping with this culture of uncertainty, entrepreneurs hire entrepre-
neurs—those willing to take the lottery ticket gamble along with the 
founders.50 
Equity compensation is a commitment to the “long-term view” 
of the company.51 It is considered a lottery ticket because it may or 
may not pay off in the long-term. Employees must make, as Profes-
sor Thomas Smith of the University of San Diego Law School esti-
mates, an “entrepreneurial judgment” that their labor and personal 
investment in the company has a chance (even if remote) that the 
payoff will be worth the investment.52 Smith also notes that this in-
vestment creates an opportunity cost of “the difference between the 
 
 45 RIES, supra note 8, at 28. 
 46 Smith, supra note 16, at 607; see Casserly, supra note 32. 
 47 Pozen, supra note 7, at 288–89. 
 48 Smith, supra note 16, at 607–08; Ted O’Donoghue & Jason Somerville, 
Modeling Risk Aversion in Economics, 32 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 91 (2018). 
 49 See Smith, supra note 16, at 600; see also RIES, supra note 8, at ix. 
 50 See Smith, supra note 16, at 609–11; see also Martin Zwilling, A Growing 
Startup Should Only Hire Entrepreneurs, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2011, 11:08 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2011/02/23/a-growing-startup-
should-only-hire-entrepreneurs/ (“This commitment to hire people who think like 
entrepreneurs, or install an ‘owners mindset’ in every employee, should be a high 
priority in every business.”). 
 51 Booth, supra note 32, at 276–77; see Lie & Que, supra note 31, at 4. “Stock 
option grants might serve to reduce turnovers . . . . [T]hey are effectively deferred 
payments, such that employees who leave might forego substantial value, either 
because they exercise the options early thereby giving up time value, or forfeit 
unvested options, thereby giving up their entire value.” Id. at 1. 
 52 Smith, supra note 16, at 609–11. 
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present value of [an employee’s] total compensation at the startup 
and the present value of whatever [their] total compensation would 
have been at [their] best available alternative.”53 Moreover, Smith 
describes this “willingness of a startup employee to accept stock op-
tions in lieu of greater cash compensation” as “send[ing] a powerful 
signal to the employer that the prospective employee shares the 
founders’ entrepreneurial perception regarding the startup’s signifi-
cant opportunity for success, and that the candidate is willing to join 
[their] economic fate to that of the new company.”54 Importantly, 
this gambit aligns employees’ goals with those of the founders and 
the enterprise as a whole55: The very compensation structure itself 
demands that employees take risks and dedicate themselves to the 
company’s success.56 
To further cement this commitment, employees can often only 
attain the equity startups promise in stock option plans through vest-
ing—a schedule by which employees are only able to purchase stock 
in the company once they reach specific contractual timing or mile-
stone factors.57 Importantly, the vesting schedule creates an incen-
tive to keep employees not only working towards the company’s 
success,58 but also from leaving to go to another venture;59 employ-
ees’ equity opportunities will not vest (be exercisable) if they do not 
reach the timing or valuation milestones.60 Vesting schedules often 
 
 53 Id. at 610. 
 54 Id. at 595. 
 55 Id. at 592; see Lie & Que, supra note 31, at 1 (“An obvious motivation for 
awarding such securities is to align incentives of employees with those of share-
holders.”). 
 56 See id. 
 57 REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228 (“Stock options . . . ’vest’ (become 
exercisable) over time or upon the achievement of certain goals . . . .”); Smith, 
supra note 16, at 586 (“The option-vesting schedule is the timetable by which the 
employee may actually exercise her stock options to buy company stock. When 
the company first grants the employee options, they are typically not exercisable 
immediately to buy stock.”); see Linfield, supra note 14 (“Founder’s Stock is of-
ten subject to a vesting schedule.”). 
 58 Smith, supra note 16, at 586. 
 59 Booth, supra note 32, at 276–77 (commenting that equity compensation 
structures can encourage employees to invest their time and energy in a company 
with a “long-term view”). 
 60 See REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 228. 
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take place over four years,61 meaning that the equity purchase op-
portunities promised to the employee would vest in increments and 
normally take a full four years to be complete. Some scholars have 
interpreted this schedule to have a more sinister meaning, noting that 
the schedule often represents a “rough guess of how long an em-
ployee should stay at the startup in order for the firm to get the most 
value out of the employee.”62 
To further tie equity compensation to dedication and longevity 
at the venture, startups often subject vesting to a cliff, a period of 
time (often one year) that the employee must be at the company be-
fore they can actualize their first equity purchase opportunity.63 
Meaning that, if the employee resigns any time before the cliff, they 
forgo their ability to receive or purchase any stock64—irrespective 
of how valuable that equity purchase may have been in their deci-
sion to join the company in the first place or how much of their over-
all compensation package was supplemented with equity. 
In a startup, culture is everything—compensation included. This 
inherent equity gambit requires long-term dedication for any sort of 
payoff, and with it comes the blurring of lines between the work 
product and the people who make it. 
B. Startup Culture as Told by Soylent and Uber 
Employees’ willingness to make the lottery ticket65 gambit is a 
trait that often goes hand-in-hand with other entrepreneurial, and 
sometimes aberrant or even eccentric, behaviors. This eccentricity 
is exemplified in the media through commentaries on Twitter CEO 
Jack Dorsey’s fasting, infamous Theranos founder Elizabeth 
 
 61 Linfield, supra note 14; see also Lie & Que, supra note 31, at 4 (noting 
that employee turnover after option grants is lower until time of vesting, at which 
point retention value as an impetus for providing option grants is minimal). 
 62 Smith, supra note 16, at 600. 
 63 Linfield, supra note 14. 
 64 See Smith, supra note 16, at 586. 
 65 Smith, supra note 16, at 607–09. 
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Holmes’ adherence to green juice,66 or the widespread use of the 
meal replacement drink, Soylent, in lieu of taking time to eat.67 
Noted technology author and programmer Clive Thompson 
wrote that the popularity of Soylent in startup culture is part of an 
“obsession with efficiency.”68 But, the idea of trading meals for pro-
tein drinks in the interest of getting back to work quicker—or not 
taking a break at all69—serves as a dark commentary on startup cul-
ture as a whole. David Heinemeier Hansson, the creator of the Ruby 
on Rails programming framework and co-founder of Basecamp, 
along with co-author, CEO, and co-founder of Basecamp, Jason 
Fried, express this sentiment in their book, It Doesn’t Have to Be 
Crazy at Work: 
Whenever executives talk about how their company 
is really like a big ol’ family, beware. They’re usu-
ally not referring to how the company is going to pro-
tect you no matter what or love you unconditionally. 
You know, like healthy families would. Their motive 
is rather more likely to be a unidirectional form of 
sacrifice: yours. . . . You’re not just working long 
nights or skipping a vacation to further the bottom 
line; no, no, you’re doing this for the family. Such a 
blunt emotional appeal is only needed if someone is 
 
 66 Nicole Lyn Pesce, Most of Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey’s Intense Wellness 
Habits Actually Make Sense, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 15, 2019, 9:20 AM), 
https://marketwatch.com/story/most-of-twitter-ceo-jack-dorseys-intense-well-
ness-habits-actually-make-sense-2019-04-15. 
 67 See CLIVE THOMPSON, CODERS: THE MAKING OF A NEW TRIBE AND THE 
REMAKING OF THE WORLD 139–41 (2019); see also Brian X. Chen, In Busy Sili-
con Valley, Protein Powder Is in Demand, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2015), https://ny-
times.com/2015/05/25/technology/in-busy-silicon-valley-protein-powder-is-in-
demand.html?_r=0. 
 68 THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 141. 
 69 See id. at 140–41 (“Several start-up programmers told me they kept their 
pantries stocked with it. It was perfect for the nonstop workload endemic in Sili-
con Valley, the 14-hour-long jags of coding . . . .”). 
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trying to make you forget about your rational self-
interest.70 
This adherence to the success of the work product—and, 
thereby, the company—can be interpreted as a variation on a theme 
of the same deferred-payoff, all-for-one and one-for-all ideology re-
quired upon signing up to work at a startup in the first place. In other 
words, if founders can sacrifice for the sake of success, other startup 
employees can (or should), too. 
Still, regardless of how one might view the advent of Soylent or 
the culture that it may foster, its popularity is undeniable, as it has 
broken free from the confines of Silicon Valley and been recently 
introduced into thousands of “brick-and-mortar retail locations,” 
such as Walmart, since April 2019.71 In the spirit of innovation, 
Clive Thompson notes that “[t]his fetish for efficiency is what has 
driven the delirious explosion of ‘on demand’ services” such as 
quicker Amazon deliveries, or entire companies designed to do laun-
dry, clean apartments, or shop for groceries.72 A more positive in-
terpretation of this phenomenon is that products like Soylent illus-
trate the creation of entirely new subsets of industries that are based 
on innovation, efficiency, and problem-solving.73 Like with Airbnb 
and its impact on the world,74 the benefit or detriment of startup cul-
ture’s characteristics often lie in the eye of the beholder. And, much 
like Airbnb itself, it can sometimes become a seemingly unstoppable 
 
 70 JASON FRIED & DAVID H. HANSSON, IT DOESN’T HAVE TO BE CRAZY AT 
WORK 77–78 (2018). Netflix notably presents a rare challenge to this ideology, 
treating its employees as a “team” instead of a “family” as a foundational predi-
cate of its business model. Vivian Giang, She Created Netflix’s Culture and It 
Ultimately Got Her Fired, FASTCOMPANY (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.fastcom-
pany.com/3056662/she-created-netflixs-culture-and-it-ultimately-got-her-fired. 
The reality that this is touted as an effective competitive edge for Netflix and is 
viewed as somewhat unusual by employees illustrates the uniqueness of this ap-
proach. Land of the Giants, “Netflix is a team, not a family”, VOX, (June 23, 
2020), https://www.vox.com/land-of-the-giants-podcast. 
 71 Marry Ellen Shoup, Soylent Rolls out to 4,378 Walmart Stores, Targets 
20,000 Retail Locations Nationwide, FOODNAVIGATOR-USA (Apr. 8, 2019, 4:56 
PM), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2019/04/08/Soylent-goes-na-
tionwide-with-Walmart. 
 72 THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 141. 
 73 See id. at 139–41. 
 74 See Airbnb Impacts, supra note 10; BIVENS, supra note 12, at 4. 
2020] UNVESTED 317 
 
force once set in motion—irrespective of the socioeconomic or legal 
ramifications that ensue.75 
However, sometimes the effects of eschewing social, business, 
and legal norms are objectively negative. For instance, using trade 
secret laws like the Defend Trade Secrets Act to shield diversity sta-
tistics under the auspice of trade secret protection provides compa-
nies with a mechanism to shield themselves from criticism in addi-
tion to heightening the diversity disparity for people of color, in par-
ticular. 76 Also, venture capital firms that prototypically fund com-
panies like startups are notorious for placing far fewer investments 
with women and people of color—just nine percent of 10,000 inves-
tor-backed ventures polled were run by women, under two percent 
were run by Latinx founders, and only one percent were led by Black 
founders.77 On the other side of the table, even when venture capital 
firms themselves are run by people of color, a recent Stanford study 
has shown that those firms incur more bias from investors, including 
that investors “were unable to distinguish between the stronger and 
weaker black-led teams.”78 Further, bias and scrutiny extend to age 
as well; this issue was epitomized in a 2007 statement by Mark 
Zuckerberg that “young people are just smarter.”79 
 
 75 See Paris Martineau, Inside Airbnb’s ‘Guerrilla War’ Against Local Gov-
ernments, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/in-
side-airbnbs-guerrilla-war-against-local-governments/ (reporting on conflicts be-
tween Airbnb and cities around country as cities try to enforce laws surrounding 
short-term rentals, including collecting taxes). 
 76 See, Holman, supra note 20. 
 77 Mary Ann Azevedo, Untapped Opportunity: Minority Founders Still Being 
Overlooked, CRUNCHBASE NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://news.crunch-
base.com/news/untapped-opportunity-minority-founders-still-being-overlooked/. 
 78 Melissa De Witte, Venture Capital Funds Led by People of Color Face 
More Bias the Better They Perform, Stanford Researchers Find, STAN. NEWS 
SERV. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://news.stanford.edu/2019/08/12/race-influences-
professional-investors-judgments/ (finding that investors analyzing venture capi-
tal teams encountered more difficulty distinguishing between strengths and weak-
nesses of racially diverse teams relative to white-male led teams). 
 79 Margaret Kane, Say What? ‘Young People Are Just Smarter’, CNET (Mar. 
28, 2007, 7:57 AM), https://cnet.com/news/say-what-young-people-are-just-
smarter/ (“‘I want to stress the importance of being young and technical,’ [Zuck-
erberg] stated, adding that successful startups should only employ young people 
with technical expertise.”); see also Fried, supra note 20. 
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Harassment, particularly sexual harassment, is another prevalent 
facet of discriminatory behavior in the startup world. While fighting 
an ongoing employment law battle with rideshare drivers over their 
status as independent contractors or employees,80 2017 was the year 
that Uber’s culture caught up with the company in another way: sex-
ual harassment.81 In 2017, former Uber employee Susan Fowler 
published an essay online that detailed the extensive sexual harass-
ment that both she and her fellow female engineers endured: 
Uber was a pretty good-sized company at that time, 
and I had pretty standard expectations of how they 
would handle situations like this. . . . [U]nfortu-
nately, things played out quite a bit differently. When 
I reported the situation, I was told by both HR and 
upper management that even though this was clearly 
sexual harassment and he was propositioning me, it 
was this man’s first offense, and that they wouldn’t 
feel comfortable giving him anything other than a 
warning and a stern talking-to. Upper management 
told me that “he was a high performer” (i.e. had stel-
lar performance reviews from his superiors) and they 
wouldn’t feel comfortable punishing him for what 
was probably just an innocent mistake on his 
part. . . . Once I had finished up my projects and saw 
that things weren’t going to change, I . . . requested a 
transfer. I met all of the qualifications for transferring 
– I had managers who wanted me on their teams, and 
 
 80 See Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Answer Will 
Shape The Sharing Economy, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017, 11:24 AM), 
https://forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-
the-answer-will-shape-the-sharing-economy/; see also Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble 
With Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative that Worker Classification Fights, 81 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 107, 107–09 (2018) (arguing that “gig” economy narrative 
constructed and furthered by companies behooves them at their workers’ expense, 
in that narrative absolves companies from being responsible for their workers in 
traditional ways by minimizing the connection between the company and its 
workers). 
 81 Johana Bhuiyan, With Just Her Words, Susan Fowler Brought Uber to Its 
Knees, VOX (Dec. 6, 2017, 5:16 PM), https://vox.com/2017/12/6/16680602/su-
san-fowler-uber-engineer-recode-100-diversity-sexual-harassment. 
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I had a perfect performance score – so I didn’t see 
how anything could go wrong. And then my transfer 
was blocked. According to my manager, his man-
ager, and the director, my transfer was being blocked 
because I had undocumented performance prob-
lems.82 
Susan Fowler’s account brought about several internal investi-
gations within Uber, including one conducted by the former Attor-
ney General of the United States, Eric Holder.83 Those investiga-
tions contributed to, among other things, the resignation of then-
CEO Travis Kalanick.84 Fowler’s decision to speak out catalyzed an 
outpouring of similar accounts from other women working at 
startups, and forced a reckoning in the spirit of the #MeToo move-
ment.85 Importantly, this facet of startup culture and the behavior 
that feeds it are not exclusive to Uber, and this brand of harassment 
translates to deficiencies in employee or investment diversity.86 
The aim of this Note is not to criticize the equity compensation 
regularly employed by startups or their unique culture. Instead, the 
aim is to illustrate that startups are often boundary-pushing by nature 
in how they contract with and regard employees. These traits, while 
beneficial in some respects, can culminate to form a pervasive cul-
ture87 that can erode or violate the rights of their employees. More-
over, this Note identifies discrimination as a key reason that a startup 
employee would walk away from their equity, an integral and cov-
eted part of their compensation. Subsequently, this Note analyzes 
how both a misunderstanding of young startups and associated gaps 
in federal antidiscrimination laws deprive employees targeted by 
 
 82 Susan J. Fowler, Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year At Uber (Feb. 
19, 2017), https://susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-one-very-
strange-year-at-uber. 
 83 Bhuiyan, supra note 81. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See also Laila Alawa, Sexual Harassment in The Startup Industry Really 
Isn’t Going Away Anytime Soon, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018, 4:48 PM), 
https://forbes.com/sites/payout/2018/02/09/sexual-harassment-in-the-startup-in-
dustry-really-isnt-going-away-anytime-soon/. 
 87 See JASON FRIED & DAVID H. HANSSON, REWORK 249 (2010) (“Culture is 
the byproduct of consistent behavior.”). 
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discrimination of their rights relative to these equity agreements. 
Currently, employees who are the victims of discrimination have lit-
tle to no recourse to recover when resignation feels like their only 
choice. 
Harkening back for a moment to the hypothetical about Alex—
the twenty-two-year old software engineer at a startup of eleven peo-
ple who, for the past several months, has been harassed at work—
we can now add a few more critical, compounding pieces to Alex’s 
story. Alex’s compensation is comprised of a $40,000 per year sal-
ary that includes the option to purchase up to 2,000 shares on a four-
year vesting schedule with a one-year cliff. Alex specifically sought 
equity compensation as a condition of taking a lower cash salary and 
agreeing to work at the company. Having only worked for the 
startup for ten months, Alex has not yet reached the twelve-month 
(one-year) cliff at which the opportunity to purchase 500 shares, or 
twenty-five percent of the total over four years, would vest. None-
theless, because the stalking and in-office harassment have yet to 
cease, Alex still feels that there is no other recourse but to resign in 
the interest of safety. 
II. THE NEW BLUE-COLLAR AND WHY IT MATTERS 
Startups are not going anywhere—they are as inevitable as the 
entrepreneurs that dream of them. And there is nothing wrong with 
that. But, with that understanding, the reader should acknowledge 
that startups do, in fact, push and change the legal landscape,88 
whether or not the law is ready for such alterations or aberrations in 
its use.89 
In The Lean Startup, Eric Ries notes that “huge productivity in-
creases made possible by modern management and technology have 
created more productive capacity than firms know what to do 
with.”90 By increasing productivity, firms can manufacture the nec-
essary output without as much human power, inevitably creating a 
 
 88 Hobbs, supra note 9, at 1. 
 89 See BIVENS, supra note 12, at 4; Martineau, supra note 75; Ben-Shahar, 
supra note 80. 
 90 RIES, supra note 8, at 16. 
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dearth of traditional manufacturing positions91 in regions most af-
fected by declines in traditional labor positions, such as the coal 
mining industry of Kentucky, which saw the number of coal miners 
in the state decrease by over half between 2008 to 2016.92 In the 
midst of watching his livelihood, heritage, and town collapse as jobs 
disappeared, former coalminer Rusty Justice decided to leave be-
hind his coal-shipping and land-formation business and pivot to the 
creation of a new startup: a computer programming boot camp 
called Bit Source.93 
Nine hundred fifty people applied for the first cohort.94 Of the 
only eleven spaces available, Bit Source selected “a mine safety in-
spector, an underground miner, and a college-educated mechanic 
who’d fixed conveyer belts in the mines.”95 After grueling days 
learning programming languages like JavaScript and creating apps 
that taught skills such as how to store and retrieve information from 
a database, the now-programmers were able to compile their lessons 
into jobs creating sites and applications.96 More importantly, they 
were able to again contribute to the commerce and growth of their 
community—not only by receiving “tent-pole salaries”97 that could 
support other industries, but also in becoming activists for their own 
communities by creating an application to address opioid addic-
tion.98 In his book Coders, Clive Thompson notes of this coding rev-
olution by stating that “[i]t’s become more of a ticket to the middle 
class; something that the great mass of people can see as a route to 
reasonably stable, enjoyable employment. It’s like, in other words, 
 
 91 Id. (citing Hale Stewart, US Manufacturing Is Not Dead, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 28, 2010, 1:48 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/fea-
tures/us-manufacturing-is-not-dead/); see also James Manyika, et. al, Harnessing 
Automation for a Future That Works, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Jan. 2017), 
https://mckinsey.com/featured-insights/digital-disruption/harnessing-automa-
tion-for-a-future-that-works (finding that almost half of all current labor jobs 
could be automated, representing approximately fifteen trillion dollars in wages 
to workers). 
 92 THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 343. 
 93 Id. at 344. 
 94 Id. at 345. 
 95 Id. at 345–46. 
 96 Id. at 346–47. 
 97 Id. at 344. 
 98 Id. at 347. 
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pretty much what mining used to be around Kentucky.”99 For Rusty 
Justice, “These are blue-collar workers . . . [a]nd this is blue-collar 
work.”100 
Moreover, this inquiry matters because the number of startups 
like Bit Source and other associated coding jobs is only growing, 
bringing with it the “rise of ‘mid-tech.’”101 Despite its eponymous 
hold over the perceived quintessence of the software engineer, Sili-
con Valley only accounts for about eight percent,102 or approxi-
mately one-tenth103 of programming jobs in the United States. Yet, 
when lawmakers want a brief on startups—particularly those heav-
ily involved in tech, they turn directly to Silicon Valley—they haul 
before them various tech CEOs at the helm of billion-dollar corpo-
rations.104 
While Mark Zuckerberg is able to testify about the workings of 
Facebook, that does not necessarily make him (or other like heads 
of large startups) specifically able to inform lawmakers about the 
needs of startups like Bit Source that are geographically, culturally, 
or proportionally distinct from the prototypical Silicon Valley 
model. If Bit Source in Eastern Kentucky is taken as a microcosm 
for the growing mid-tech movement across the country, and there 
 
 99 Id. at 348. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Michael J. Coren, The American Midwest is Quickly Becoming a Blue-Col-
lar Version of Silicon Valley, QUARTZ (Feb. 25, 2018), https://qz.com/
1212875/the-american-midwest-is-quickly-becoming-a-blue-collar-version-of-
silicon-valley/ (describing “mid-tech” as programming or engineering positions 
that do not require traditional computer science or engineering degrees—or even 
a degree at all.). 
 102 Clive Thompson, The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is Coding, WIRED (Feb. 
08, 2017, 12:38 PM) [hereinafter The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is Coding], 
https://wired.com/2017/02/programming-is-the-new-blue-collar-job/. 
 103 THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 349. 
 104 See Clive Thompson, Why Congress Needs to Revive its Tech Support 
Team, WIRED (July. 15, 2010, 7:00 AM) [hereinafter Why Congress Needs to Re-
vive its Tech Support Team], https://wired.com/story/why-congress-needs-to-re-
vive-its-tech-support-team/; Makena Kelly, Congress Isn’t Buying Mark Zucker-
berg’s Pitch for Libra, The VERGE (Oct. 23, 2019, 5:37 PM), https://www.thev-
erge.com/2019/10/23/20929313/mark-zuckerberg-hearing-congress-libra-cali-
bra-facebook-maxine-waters. 
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are far more programming jobs105 (and, presumably, startup-related 
businesses or positions) scattered across the United States, then it is 
concerning that Silicon Valley is still the point representative for this 
movement. This is because Silicon Valley is not representative of 
the entirety of startup culture.106 With Congress having long-dis-
banded the Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”),107 lawmak-
ers can easily have a very skewed understanding of startups by pri-
marily, or only, targeting inquiries at the now-massive technology 
companies that have since outgrown their status as startups, despite 
once setting the tone for startup culture.108 
Federal Communications Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel, 
in an appeal to lawmakers to bring back the OTA, emphasized that, 
As technology becomes ingrained in our everyday 
lives, we may not always know just how it all 
works. . . . The digital age is so complex that old 
laws do not neatly capture how we interact with new 
technologies, and understandable facts about how the 
online world works are in short supply. . . . It’s espe-
cially difficult for legislators and regulators to de-
velop this baseline of understanding when innova-
tion can invert much of what we think we know so 
quickly.109 
Taking this more broadly, as was the edict of the OTA, this 
would not only apply to advancing technology, but also to the 
 
 105 See THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 349; The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is 
Coding, supra note 102. 
 106 See The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is Coding, supra note 102. 
 107 See Technology Assessment and the Work of Congress, PRINCETON [here-
inafter OTA and the Work of Congress], https://www.princeton.edu/
~ota/ns20/cong_f.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). OTA was a Congressional 
advisory group in service from 1972 until 1995 and provided a policy-focused 
analytical approach to technology, science, and business that produced arguably 
invaluable resources for lawmakers. See id. 
 108 See Why Congress Needs to Revive its Tech Support Team, supra note 104. 
 109 Jessica Rosenworcel, The Facebook Hearings Demonstrate the Need for 
Technology Policy Experts in Congress, NBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018, 3:44 AM), 
https://nbcnews.com/think/opinion/facebook-hearings-demonstrate-need-tech-
nology-policy-experts-congress-ncna865611. 
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startups that utilize, engage in, and produce that technology. More-
over, without an in-depth picture of what is occurring across the 
startup landscape, such a myopic analysis of startups could easily 
lead lawmakers to overlook more obscure issues that affect only 
startups of a certain region, culture, or—and critical to the inquiry 
in this Note—size. 
Although many issues may fall under this description, the one of 
principal concern in this paper is that of size, due to its effect on the 
disparate application of federal antidiscrimination laws. If you ask a 
startup founder for their definition of a startup, the answer often con-
tains the elements of risk, sacrifice, and innovation.110 The Merriam-
Webster dictionary defines it, among other things, as “a fledgling 
business enterprise.”111 Here, too, there is no one-size-fits-all an-
swer.112 Startups can have over 80 employees, or very few, and are 
of varying ages and stages of investment.113 Crunchbase’s metrics 
reflect that there were 4,032 startups founded in 2019 alone.114 As 
of June 2020, out of the ten top-trending 2019-founded startups re-
flected on Crunchbase’s Leaderboard tool, three were listed as hav-
ing only one-to-ten employees.115 The capitalization of those three 
startups alone ranges from $2.8 million to $7 million dollars.116 Go-
ing back further to Crunchbase’s Leaderboard metrics for startups 
founded in 2017, as of June 2020, the top trending startup117 with a 
 
 110 See Natalie Robehmed, What Is A Startup?, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2013, 8:42 
AM), https://forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2013/12/16/what-is-a-startup/. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Startups Founded in 2019, CRUNCHBASE, https://crunchbase.com/hub/
startups-founded-in-2019#section-overview (last visited June 23, 2020). 
 115 Startups Founded in 2019: Leaderboard, CRUNCHBASE, https://crunch-
base.com/hub/startups-founded-in-2019/top/org_top_rank_delta_d30_list#sec-
tion-recent-news-activity (last visited June 23, 2020); see Jupiter, CRUNCHBASE, 
https://crunchbase.com/organization/talar#section-overview last visited June 23, 
2020), Cabana, CRUNCHBASE https://crunchbase.com/organization/cabana-7453 
(last visited June 23, 2020), Opora, CRUNCHBASE, https://crunchbase.com/organ-
ization/opora-technologies (last visited June 23, 2020). 
 116 See Jupiter, supra note 115, Opora, supra note 115. 
 117 Startups Founded in 2017: Leaderboard, CRUNCHBASE, https://crunch-
base.com/hub/startups-founded-in-2017/top/org_top_rank_delta_d30_list#sec-
tion-leaderboard (last visited June 23, 2020). 
2020] UNVESTED 325 
 
capitalization of $2.6 million dollars is still indicated as having only 
one-to-ten employees.118 Importantly, this is to say nothing about 
these specific entities or their individual business practices. It is 
simply a legal reality that, irrespective of the years in business or 
level of investment, with fewer than fifteen employees, neither Title 
VII nor the ADEA apply to any of them or to startups like them.119 
In the age of what Eric Ries refers to as the “entrepreneurial renais-
sance,”120 society’s lack of understanding of startups and startup cul-
ture is more dire than ever. Ready or not, the law must adapt. 
While this Note provides no one definite solution, the subse-
quent inquiry into antidiscrimination and employment law illumi-
nates how the confluence of a company culture that is vulnerable to 
elements of discrimination,121 a pay structure that binds employees’ 
compensation and future to the company itself,122 and a gap in fed-
eral antidiscrimination law depending on the company’s size culmi-
nate to leave some employees with little recourse to recover when 
they feel forced to resign from a startup due to discriminatory be-
havior. 
III. ABOVE THE THRESHOLD: TITLE VII AND OTHER FEDERAL 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AS THEY WERE DESIGNED TO WORK 
A. The Laws and Their History 
It is necessary to first analyze the laws at play to understand how 
damaging the deficiency of antidiscrimination protections in the 
United States can be for startup employees attempting to recover for 
equity compensation employment contracts. Chief among these, for 
its breadth and applicability to the vulnerabilities of startup culture, 
is Title VII. 
As it was passed in 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, 
 
 118 Advekit, CRUNCHBASE, https://crunchbase.com/organization/advekit (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
 119 EEOC Small Business Requirements, supra note 28. 
 120 RIES, supra note 8, at 16. 
 121 See Part I, Section B. 
 122 See Part I, Section A. 
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sex, or national origin.”123 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Lily 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 further amended Title VII124 to in-
clude “discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth or related 
medical conditions, and marriage status for women.”125 Moreover, 
Stephanie Bornstein expands on this in saying that “Title 
VII . . . prohibits discrimination in hiring, firing, pay, and other 
‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of work, as well as the adoption of 
policies or practices that ‘deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities’ ‘because of’ a protected classification . . . .”126 Apply-
ing to companies with fifteen or more employees,127 Title VII cre-
ated the EEOC with the purpose of “enforc[ing] [its] statutory pro-
visions against discrimination . . . .”128 
Claims under Title VII take three forms: “disparate treatment, 
disparate impact, and harassment,”129 though “harassment, stereo-
typing, and, for the protected classes of religion and pregnancy, fail-
ure to accommodate” are arguably sub-classifications of disparate 
treatment.130 To make a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII, 
an employee must claim that their employer intentionally discrimi-
nated against them.131 Key elements of this claim lie in the finding 
that the employee was a member of a protected class and that they 
were qualified for the employment or benefits thereof but were oth-
erwise denied due to discrimination.132 Further, employee-claimants 
can illustrate disparate impact by showing that their employer’s 
 
 123 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 124 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www1.eeoc.gov//laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm?ren-
derforprint=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (describing, in editor’s note prepended, 
further amendment history of Title VII). 
 125 REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215. 
 126 Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 
1061 (2017). 
 127 EEOC Small Business Requirements, supra note 28. 
 128 Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 663 
(2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a)). 
 129 REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215. 
 130 Bornstein, supra note 126, at 1061. 
 131 REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215. 
 132 Id.; Jennifer Issacs, Proving Title VII Discrimination in 2019, ABA, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/projects/no-limits/proving-
title-vii-discrimination-in-2019/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
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seemingly-neutral employment policy or systematized workplace 
practice effectively discriminated against members of a Title VII 
protected class.133 For disparate impact, employee-claimants need 
not prove employer intentionality, unlike with disparate treat-
ment.134 
The most common form of Title VII claims, however, is harass-
ment.135 A harassment claim could appear in the form of “denial of 
an employment benefit for refusal to submit to sexual advances by 
a supervisor.”136 For this “quid pro quo” harassment, courts may 
hold employers responsible even if they were not aware of the har-
assment and had specific policies prohibiting harassment.137 Fur-
ther, an employee can assert a harassment claim under Title VII by 
showing that the workplace fostered a hostile environment for the 
employee.138 “Hostile work environment” claims are those that al-
lege that an employee, as a member of a protected class under Title 
VII, was subjected by his or her employer to “unwelcome comments 
or conduct” based on that protected status and that the comments or 
conduct were substantial enough to “unreasonably [interfere] with 
[the] employee’s ability to work effectively” because the comments 
or conduct “created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work envi-
ronment.”139 
Regarding hostile work environment harassment claims, Profes-
sor Mary Anne Franks from the University of Miami School of Law 
notes that “EEOC guidelines state that employers are liable when 
they have actual knowledge of the harassment and fail to act 
promptly and effectively.”140 However, Professor Franks also points 
 
 133 Bornstein, supra note 126, at 1061. 
 134 REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215; see Issacs, supra note 132. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Franks, supra note 128, at 664 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742 (1998)); see Crystal L. Norrick, Eliminating the Intent Requirement 
in Constructive Discharge Cases: Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 47 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1813, 1818 (2006) (explaining that Supreme Court in Ellerth 
found that harassment created a “tangible employment action” and “reasoned that, 
in making tangible employment decisions, a supervisor uses her authority ‘to 
make economic decisions affecting other employers under . . . her control.’”). 
 138 REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Franks, supra note 128, at 664. 
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out that, when harassment does not correspond to a “tangible loss of 
employment benefits,” employers are able to skirt liability by insist-
ing that the plaintiff did not take “preventative or corrective” action, 
and that the employer themselves “took reasonable care” to amelio-
rate the harassment.141 Further, in all three typical classes of Title 
VII claims—disparate treatment, disparate impact, and harass-
ment—the law allows employers to mount an affirmative defense if 
they can demonstrate that the alleged discrimination against a pro-
tected class is a “bona fide occupational qualification,” and is nec-
essary for the normal functioning of the business.142 In Pennsylvania 
State Police v. Suders, the Supreme Court further “delineate[d] two 
categories of hostile work environment claims: (1) harassment that 
‘culminates in tangible employment action,’ for which employers 
are strictly liable, and (2) harassment that takes place in the absence 
of a tangible employment action, to which employers may assert an 
affirmative defense.”143 
Pursuant to the EEOC’s guidelines on federal laws that prohibit 
workplace discrimination, “Title VII prohibits not only intentional 
discrimination, but also practices that have the effect of discriminat-
ing against individuals because of their race, color, national origin, 
religion, or sex.”144 Professor Chuck Henson from the University of 
Missouri School of Law notes that the aims of Title VII bring about 
a cognitive dissonance between the idea that Title VII is supposed 
to eradicate employment discrimination and the jurisprudential re-
ality that Title VII is a delicate balancing act between preserving 
business and managerial autonomy while also preventing the most 
 
 141 Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 542 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998)). 
 142 REED & BARRON, supra note 5, at 215; see Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. 405, 406 (1975) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 439 
n.9 (1971)) (explaining that “[a]s is clear from Griggs, . . . and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission’s Guidelines for employers seeking to determine 
through professional validation studies whether employment tests are job related, 
such test are impermissible unless shown . . . to be ‘predictive of or significantly 
correlated with important elements of work behavior which compromise or are 
relevant to the job . . . .’”). 
 143 Norrick, supra note 137, at 1818 (quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 
U.S. 129, 143 (2004), to illustrate when an affirmative defense to alleged discrim-
ination may be raised relative to Supreme Court’s analysis in Suders). 
 144 Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and Answers, 
https://eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
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insidious and obvious forms of discrimination.145 Professor Henson 
further dissects the background of the legislation that eventually be-
came Title VII, noting that prior drafts contained the specific pur-
pose “that it is the national policy to protect the right of the individ-
ual to be free from [employment] discrimination.”146 This underly-
ing purpose, albeit not written into the language of the law, none-
theless has bearing on the remedial outcomes of Title VII cases: For 
example, in Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Supreme Court fur-
ther expanded upon a court’s duty to remedy as outlined by the prin-
ciples of both the “prophylactic” intent of Title VII to prohibit em-
ployment discrimination as well as the corrective purpose served by 
Title VII to help “make whole” the victims of employment discrim-
ination.147 Moreover, in Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, Justice O’Connor delved further into this 
fundamental Title VII duty in quoting the Abermarle Paper opinion: 
“[t]he ‘primary objective’ of Title VII is to bring employment dis-
crimination to an end . . . by ‘achiev[ing] equality of employment 
opportunities and remov[ing] barriers that have operated in the past 
to favor an identifiable group . . . over other employees.’”148 As out-
lined by the above cases, as deficient as Title VII may be regarding 
its limited aims as described by Professor Henson,149 it nevertheless 
does attempt to make whole again those wronged by discrimination 
under Title VII. 
 
 145 See Chuck Henson, Title VII Works — That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2 U. 
MIA. RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 41, 43, 96 (2012). 
 146 Id. at 52 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963)). 
 147 Sheila Finnegan, Comment, Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and 
the ADEA, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 561, 573 (1986) (citing Abermarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 405, 417–18); Mark S. Kende, Deconstructing Construc-
tive Discharge: The Misapplication of Constructive Discharge Standards in Em-
ployment Discrimination Remedies, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 39, 45 n. 27 (1995) 
(citing Abermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 419 to explain that the purpose of the 
“make whole” language, “evident by the legislative history,” was intended to pro-
vide relief designed to put the victim back into “the position that [the victim] 
would have been in but for the discrimination.”). 
 148 Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 458 U.S. 219, 228 
(1982) (first citing Abermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 417; and then quoting 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30). 
 149 See Henson, supra note 145, at 43, 96. 
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Although this inquiry primarily focuses on Title VII, startup cul-
ture’s many problems with age discrimination also merit a brief 
analysis of the ADEA. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 applies to companies of twenty or more employees150 and is 
designed to prevent employers from discriminating against employ-
ees aged forty or older.151 Further, the ADEA is substantially similar 
to Title VII, as Sheila Finnegan notes, citing to Lorillard v. Pons, 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has observed, ‘the prohibitions of the 
ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII.’”152 
The primary difference between these two laws lies in the 
ADEA’s adoption of the remedial methods of the Fair Labor Stand-
ard Act (“FLSA”)153 in that a violation of the ADEA is considered 
tantamount to a violation of the FLSA.154 Moreover, under FLSA 
standards, employer violations of the ADEA merit backpay.155 Fi-
nally, the ADEA does not empower courts with the discretion to 
waiver on remedial standards, which they have under Title VII, and 
the law does not require employees to reasonably mitigate damages 
or have such an amount deducted from a backpay award.156 
B. Recourse and Recovery Available under Title VII and the 
ADEA 
For the purposes of this Note, what is perhaps most important 
about laws like Title VII and the ADEA is their ability to provide 
legal credibility to the claims of those who have been provably dis-
criminated against. In short, under antidiscrimination laws like Title 
VII, employees can bring claims that have the ability to make them 
 
 150 EEOC Small Business Requirements, supra note 28. 
 151 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). 
 152 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 578, 578 n.92 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
U.S. 575, 584 (1978)). 
 153 Albert B. Gerber & S. Harry Galfand, Employees’ Suits Under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 505 (1947). The Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act went into effect on October 24, 1938. Id. Per Gerber and Galfand, “The 
Act provides that any employer who violates its minimum wage or overtime pro-
visions shall be liable to the employees affected for (1) the total amount which 
was underpaid, (2) an addition equal amount as liquidated damages, (2) a reason-
able attorney’s fee, and (4) costs of the action.” Id. 
 154 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 578. 
 155 Id. at 578–79. 
 156 Id. 
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whole again, to the extent backpay and other damages can remedy 
the wrong done to them. 
The efficacy of these remedies are complicated, however, by the 
manner in which the employer terminates the employee. For exam-
ple, when an employee resigns due to, for instance, sexual harass-
ment discrimination, their best, and likely only, recourse is to re-
cover via constructive discharge due to a hostile workplace environ-
ment157—treatment “so [intolerable] that any reasonable person 
would [feel] compelled to quit.”158 Were the employee, instead, di-
rectly fired, and exhibited reasonable efforts to mitigate the damage 
caused by lost wages,159 that employee would “presumptively” be 
entitled to backpay160 if their employer violated Title VII in firing 
them.161 Importantly, Title VII and the ADEA allow courts to factor 
in the value of stock options as other forms of compensation in de-
termining backpay, frontpay, or other damages to award an em-
ployee.162 Under Abermarle Paper, both current and former employ-
ees can recover backpay for violations of Title VII.163 However, if 
the employee resigns due to a hostile and discriminatory environ-
ment in the workplace, they must first prove that they were construc-
tively discharged in order to have the ability to recover backpay or 
 
 157 Id. at 561–62. 
 158 Kende, supra note 147, at 40. 
 159 See id. at 41 (noting that there is a “freedom” that stems from direct dis-
charge as opposed to resignations, as reasonable effort to mitigate is a fairly low 
standard under Ford Motor Co.). 
 160 Backpay is defined as “[t]he wages or salary that an employee should have 
received but did not because of an employer’s unlawful action in setting or paying 
the wages or salary.” Backpay, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Fur-
ther, recovery could also include frontpay, or other associated damages as is found 
necessary by the court. Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 954–56 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (upholding award of front pay, back pay, and stock options value); see 
Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 n.8. (2004). 
 161 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 561–62 (citing Abermarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421–22 (1975)); see Kende, supra note 147, at 41 n.13 
(citing Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 458 U.S. 219, 231–
32 (1982)) (“Employees who are discriminatorily discharged are therefore pre-
sumptively entitled to a remedy.”). 
 162 Scarfo, 54 F.3d at 954–56 (affirming an award of benefits including stock 
options as result of a discriminatory termination). 
 163 Abermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 408, 422, 424. 
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other damages.164 In other words, employees who resign cannot pre-
sumptively recover under Title VII or like antidiscrimination laws, 
as they might have been able to had they been fired outright.165 
The Supreme Court declared in its landmark constructive dis-
charge case, Suders, that “Title VII encompasses employer liability 
for a constructive discharge.”166 In finding that a former Pennsylva-
nia State Police employee was discriminated against sufficient to 
bring a constructive discharge claim under Title VII,167 the Supreme 
Court then defined constructive discharge for this purpose to mean 
“[a]n employee’s reasonable decision to resign because of unendur-
able working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for re-
medial purposes. . . . The inquiry is objective: Did working condi-
tions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the em-
ployee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?”168 Or, as the 
Court noted, “essentially, [the plaintiff] presents a ‘worse case’ har-
assment scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point.”169 
The Court further stated that “a prevailing constructive discharge 
plaintiff is entitled to all damages available for formal discharge,” 
which includes, depending on the circumstances, damages resulting 
from the resignation, backpay, and frontpay.170 The Court went fur-
ther to acknowledge the “‘universal recognition’” of constructive 
discharge in lower courts as a remedial route in discrimination 
cases,171 and referred to NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp.172 as 
the first circuit court that allowed for backpay as a financial remedy. 
In terms of constructive discharge as historically addressed in 
circuit courts, Finnegan notes that early Title VII and constructive 
discharge cases, such as Young v. Southwest Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation in the Fifth Circuit, provided the foundation for the use of 
 
 164 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 561–62. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004). 
 167 Id. at 147–48, 152. 
 168 Id. at 141. 
 169 Id. at 147–48. 
 170 Id. at 147 n.8. 
 171 Id. at 142. 
 172 Id. at 141 (citing NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 243 
(1st Cir. 1953) (“[T]he first Circuit case to allow backpay award for constructive 
discharge.”)). 
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constructive discharge as a remedy to instances of employment dis-
crimination in violation of federal law.173 However, lower courts 
have not yet agreed on one single test for constructive discharge, 
with circuits split on requirements of employer intent.174 Given var-
iable interpretations of the employer intent requirement, even in the 
wake of Suders, it is yet inconclusive whether Suders definitively 
codified the majority view of constructive discharge as not requiring 
intent, although it is arguable that it has done just that, given Justice 
Thomas’s dissent in the case.175 Accordingly, the majority view is 
based on the understanding that an employee is constructively dis-
charged from their place of employment if the discrimination results 
in a hostile workplace to the end that any reasonable person in the 
same position would feel they must resign.176 This differs from the 
contrasting minority application of constructive discharge, which, in 
addition to the reasonable person requirement, requires the em-
ployee to show their former employer had the specific intent to cre-
ate those intolerable conditions in an effort to force the employee to 
resign.177 Should Suders not hold conclusively on this matter, it mer-
its a brief explanation into the circuit split due to its effect on an 
employee’s ability to even begin to bring a constructive discharge 
action under the Title VII framework. 
In the Fifth Circuit wage discrimination and constructive dis-
charge case Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., the 
court held that the plaintiff was not required to prove that her em-
ployer intended for her to resign in order to put forth a constructive 
discharge claim.178 This was the foundation for several variations of 
tests requiring, at least, lesser showings of employer intent adopted 
by circuits beyond the Fifth, including the First, Second, Third, 
 
 173 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 563 (citing Young v. Sw. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
509 F.2d 140, 145 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
 174 Id. at 562. 
 175 Norrick, supra note 137, at 1830 (“Although the Grief Brothers court re-
jected reading Suders as eliminating the need for an employee alleging construc-
tive discharge to demonstrate deliberate action on the part of the employer, Justice 
Thomas thought that the Suders majority opinion did just that.”). 
 176 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 563. 
 177 Id. at 566. 
 178 Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg, Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980); Kende, 
supra note 147, at 50–51; 
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Sixth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia.179 Conversely, the 
minority requirement is epitomized in the Tenth Circuit case Muller 
v. United States Steel Corp., where the court found a violation of 
Title VII, but would not award damages in the form of backpay to 
the plaintiff because the court did not find enough evidence to show 
that the employer intended to force the plaintiff to resign, and 
thereby could not find that the plaintiff was constructively dis-
charged.180 
Although the compensatory effect of a finding of constructive 
discharge differs for Title VII and the ADEA—with the ADEA 
viewing constructive discharge as a violation of the FLSA, thereby 
avoiding the court discretion and damage mitigation standards that 
Title VII requires181—both courses of federal antidiscrimination law 
use constructive discharge in order to allow employee-plaintiffs who 
resigned from their positions to recover backpay.182 And, as the 
Court reiterated in Suders, even under Title VII, where constructive 
discharge is an equitable remedy subject to court discretion, victims 
are nonetheless entitled to the same remedies as are victims under 
the ADEA, including backpay and damages due to their resigna-
tion.183 In summary, both Title VII and the ADEA provide construc-
tive discharge remedies to allow employees who resigned as a result 
of discrimination to be made whole by holding their employer liable 
for backpay.184 Put another way, constructive discharge under both 
laws essentially puts an employee who resigned due to discrimina-
tion in the same shoes as one who was terminated on the basis of 
discrimination, allowing them to recover the same measure of dam-
ages.185 
Professor Mark Kende notes that the heightened requirements of 
a showing of constructive discharge, as opposed to a case where an 
 
 179 Id. at 52–53; see also Finnegan, supra note 147, at 564 n.15. 
 180 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 566 (citing Muller v. United States Steel 
Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975)). This further 
illustrates that a violation of Title VII is not alone sufficient to constitute a con-
structive discharge claim. Id. 
 181 See id. at 578–80. 
 182 See id. at 563–80. 
 183 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 n. 8. (2004). 
 184 See Finnegan, supra note 147, at 561–63. 
 185 See id. at 573–74. 
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employee was fired, results in subjecting employees to continued 
discrimination.186 He further examines the public policy direc-
tives—somewhat similarly to Professor Henson’s assessment of 
cognitive dissonance with Title VII’s aims187—that cause courts to 
utilize these heightened standards of recovery because courts place 
emphasis on allowing employers and employees to remedy disa-
greements within the company such that they never enter into 
court.188 Kende’s rationale is that public policy directives emphasize 
both retaining the integrity of a business’ internal resolution mech-
anisms, reducing court intervention, as well as on limiting the po-
tential windfall for employees in the event of “the smallest sign of 
discrimination.”189 
Nevertheless, however questionable a court’s application of Ti-
tle VII may be or however successful an employee’s efforts to re-
cover backpay are thereunder, employees that have been provably 
wronged by discrimination still have codified pathways for recov-
ery. The pathways are only further emboldened by Suders if one 
construes the holding as definitively supporting the majority view, 
which is in favor of affording discrimination victims easier access 
to recourse without the intentionality requirement.190 
Put plainly, a judgment indicating a violation of Title VII or the 
ADEA is, by the sheer nature of the offense, a showing of discrimi-
nation having occurred. An employer may argue, as an affirmative 
defense, that their discriminatory scheme is permissible under Title 
VII, therefore leaving the employee unable to take any remedial ac-
tion.191 But the affirmative defense only allows the discriminatory 
behavior, it does not erase the fact that it occurred. For many em-
ployees who have a cause of action, showing a Title VII violation is 
 
 186 Kende, supra note 147, at 44 n.25, 45. 
 187 See Henson, supra note 145, at 42 n.2, 44–48. 
 188 Kende, supra note 147, at 40–41, 53, 53 n.78. 
 189 Id. at 40-41. Here, there is also a similar refrain to Henson’s analysis of the 
duality of Title VII, with many court cases (often in dicta) heralding Title VII’s 
protective aims, while also tempering recovery under and application of Title VII 
protections in an effort to not overstep the boundaries of the businesses to which 
it applies. See Henson, supra note 145, at 43. 
 190 See Norrick, supra note 137, at 1826–30. 
 191 See id. at 1818–19 (citing Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 
(2004)). 
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not, by itself, sufficient to prove a successful constructive discharge 
claim.192 However, even in the case where an employee resigns, and 
cannot presumptively recover backpay,193 the validity of a court 
finding that the employee was discriminated against by their former 
employer can bolster the employee’s constructive discharge argu-
ment.194 Such a finding lends both clarity and credibility to a plain-
tiff-employee’s cause in stating a claim that is, by definition, “har-
assment ratcheted up to the breaking point” such that any reasonable 
person would also resign.195 Put another way, once an employee re-
signs due to discrimination, they are no longer presumptively due 
damages.196 However, it is easier for that employee to prove they are 
due damages when they can illustrate that their employer tangibly 
violated Title VII or the ADEA.197 
Harkening back to the hypo from the end of Part III, were Alex 
to have worked at a company of fifteen people instead of eleven, 
Alex would be employed at a company to which Title VII applied.198 
As such, Alex could bring a claim of constructive discharge as hav-
ing been harassed, and therefore discriminated against, in an argua-
bly hostile workplace where Alex’s employer was presumptively in 
violation of Title VII. Given Suders, Alex’s claim may or may not 
be subject to the employer intent requirement in addition to the rea-
sonable person standard of constructive discharge.199 But, and of the 
utmost importance, Alex would have the ability to bring forth a 
claim of discrimination under the protection of Title VII. This would 
 
 192 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 566 (citing Muller v. United States Steel 
Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 926–30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975)). 
 193 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 561–62 (citing Abermarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421–22 (1975)); see Kende, supra note 147, at 41 n.13 
(Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 458 U.S. 219, 231–32 
(1982)) (“Employees who are discriminatorily discharged are therefore presump-
tively entitled to a remedy.”). 
 194 Suders, 542 U.S. at 143, 146–52. 
 195 Id. at 147–48. 
 196 Kende, supra note 147, at 41 n.13 (Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231–32). 
 197 See id.; Finnegan, supra note 147, at 561–62. 
 198 See Coverage of Business/Private Employers, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/coverage-businesspri-
vate-employers (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
 199 See Norrick, supra note 137, at 1830; Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 
129, 141 (2004). 
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allow Alex’s claim of constructive discharge to be predicated upon 
the Title VII violation and potentially allow Alex to recover the 
damages that resulted from the harassment and resultant resignation. 
While it will never erase the discrimination, Alex has the potential 
to be made legally and financially whole to the extent possible by 
the discretion of the court under, as Justice O’Connor stated in Ford 
Motor Co., the ideology that Title VII’s “primary objective” is to 
eradicate employment discrimination.200 
However, Alex, in working at a startup of eleven people to which 
Title VII does not apply,201 is deprived of that protection. Hinging 
on the fifteen-employee mark, what is illegal under Title VII at a 
company with just four more employees, is not illegal where Alex 
worked. Because Title VII, or any federal antidiscrimination law 
that has a minimum floor, does not protect employees like Alex that 
fall under that floor. Put another way, any startup that has fewer than 
fifteen employees—irrespective of the capital that startup has raised, 
the level of commerce it does, or the work culture it promotes—is 
not under the purview of Title VII, the ADEA, or associated federal 
antidiscrimination laws that have a minimum floor. Given the rise 
of startups of every shape and size across the nation,202 this is an 
unsustainable and overtly concerning model. 
IV. BELOW THE THRESHOLD: WHEN FEDERAL 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS DO NOT APPLY 
Even under the protection of federal antidiscrimination laws like 
Title VII and the ADEA, employees’ presumptive ability to receive 
damages for wrongs done to them shifts to a structure of construc-
tive discharge, forcing employees to prove that their resignation was 
one of last resort.203 It is the very fact of their resignation—or, ra-
ther, that they were not directly fired as a tangible offense under 
 
 200 Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 228. 
 201 EEOC Small Business Requirements, supra note 28. 
 202 See THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 349; The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is 
Coding, supra note 102. 
 203 Finnegan, supra note 147, at 561–62. 
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these laws—that fundamentally shifts the inquiry.204 Nonetheless, 
employees still have a designated pathway to recovery. 
Yet, this is not necessarily the case where an employer does not 
fall under the purview of these laws. While employees may still have 
potential avenues of recourse—such as more restrictive state laws, 
theories of unjust enrichment or breach of contract, the FLSA, and 
its subsidiary Equal Pay Act—there are none as targeted and pow-
erful as the protection given under Title VII, further solidified in 
resounding cases such as Suders.205 
A. When State Laws are Not Enough 
The EEOC acknowledges that, even beyond the antidiscrimina-
tion laws under its enforcement power, like Title VII and the ADEA, 
there may be different or more restrictive state laws that still ap-
ply.206 Similar to section 633 of the ADEA,207 Title VII Section 
2000(e)-7 stipulates: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt 
or relieve any person from any liability, duty, pen-
alty, or punishment provided by any present or future 
law of any State or political subdivision of a State, 
other than any such law which purports to require the 
doing of any act which would be an unlawful em-
ployment practice under this subchapter.208 
State antidiscrimination laws, however, are not universally more 
protective to employees than Title VII, as states range from extend-
ing certain antidiscrimination protections to companies of one 
 
 204 See id. 
 205 See infra Part IV, Section A; see also Norrick, supra note 137, at 1830 
(commenting on Justice Thomas’ belief that Suders removed employer intent re-
quirement, which would effectively be a lower bar for employee plaintiffs to show 
to have a successful Title VII constructive discharge claim); Suders, 542 U.S. at 
141. 
 206 See EEOC Small Business Requirements, supra note 28. 
 207 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)–(b). 
 208 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-7. 
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employee to the Title VII limit of fifteen employees.209 Furthermore, 
states do not always guarantee that these protections mirror those 
Title VII protected classes such as race, national origin, or sex.210 
Alabama, for instance, has no policy on sexual harassment,211 with 
the Alabama Supreme Court formally declaring in Stevenson v. Pre-
cision Standard, Inc. that “[i]t is well settled that Alabama does not 
recognize an independent cause of action of sexual harassment. In-
stead, claims of sexual harassment are maintained under common-
law tort theories . . . .”212 Georgia is similar in that, while it does 
have a Fair Employment Practices Act that extends discrimination 
protections to those protected classes that mirror Title VII, its equiv-
alent law only applies to public agencies’ officers and employees, 
not private employers.213 
B. A Last Resort: Courts’ Reluctance to Use Equitable 
Principles to Remedy Discriminatory Wrongs 
As suggested by Alabama’s deference to other legal remedies in 
lieu of direct antidiscrimination statutes, there are also tort and con-
tract remedies under which employees can attempt to recover finan-
cially.214 However, such methods may prove inadequate as they do 
not directly address financial loss as the result of discriminatory 
treatment.215 Nonetheless, some scholars have put forward novel 
ideas on how an employee could recover under these less codified 
legal theories. For example, in her assessment of the forfeiture of 
employee stock options in the case of involuntary termination, Ka-
ren Madsen presents remedies that may prove useful when applied 
 
 209 See Discrimination — Employment Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Jul. 27, 2015), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employ-
ment/discrimination-employment.aspx. 
 210 See Discrimination and Harassment in the Workplace, NAT’L CONF. 
STATE LEGISLATURE (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/employment-discrimination.aspx. 
 211 See Ally Windsor Howell, 2 Ala. Pers. Inj. & Torts § 11:12 (2019 ed.). 
 212 Stevenson v. Precision Standard, Inc., 762 So.2d 820, 825 n.6 (Ala. 1999). 
 213 GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-21 (West 2019). 
 214 See Stevenson, 762 So.2d at 825 n.6. 
 215 See Karen A. Madsen, Employee Stock Options: Is Complete Forfeiture of 
Non-Vested Stock Options Fair and Equitable When an Employee is Involuntarily 
Terminated Without Cause, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 213, 226–27, 330–35 
(1993). 
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to employees who resign under exceptional circumstances, like, for 
instance, pervasive discrimination.216 Madsen, in her inquiry, ques-
tions the fairness of allowing companies to contractually promise 
employees equity and thereby reap the benefits of doing so, only to 
terminate the employee before their equity has vested.217 While 
Madsen’s analysis only addresses employees who were terminated 
for legitimate, nondiscriminatory purposes,218 it can also apply to 
employees who were discriminatorily terminated or resigned due to 
pervasive discrimination. Indeed, Madsen’s analysis is particularly 
relevant in those cases given that her aim is to highlight the inequity 
of equity compensation schemes219 and illustrate the necessity of 
other forms of payment, such as pro rata vesting.220 
In assessing further equitable remedies beyond contractual inter-
pretation, Madsen proposes recourse such as unjust enrichment, sub-
stantial performance, and promissory estoppel.221 However, not all 
will apply in discrimination cases. Remedies such as promissory es-
toppel,222 for example, traditionally require consideration in the 
form of the employee not terminating their employment.223 Unjust 
enrichment, however, may apply, given that it arises in situations 
where one party retains a benefit conferred by another party in a 
legally-unjustifiable manner, and is, therefore, liable to make whole 
the party that conferred the benefit, as the receiving party was un-
justly enriched by that benefit.224 In support, Madsen points to Lucas 
v. Segrave Corp. where the court held that employees wrongfully 
 
 216 See id. at 217–19, 226–27, 330–35. 
 217 See id. at 214. 
 218 See id. at 213–14, 224. 
 219 See id. at 224. (“This problem is particularly disturbing in the case of an 
unsophisticated employee who, without the advice of a lawyer, may not foresee 
the potential forfeiture problems associated with the vesting/termination provi-
sions of a stock option grant before signing it.”). 
 220 See Madsen, supra note 215, at 214, 224–35. 
 221 See id. at 230–34. 
 222 Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Promissory estoppel 
is, essentially, a remedy to detrimental reliance wherein the party that perpetrated 
the injustice (or breaking of the promise) can be required to uphold the promise 
to prevent the injustice or inequity. Id. 
 223 Madsen, supra note 215, at 234. 
 224 See id. at 232–33; Unjust Enrichment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019). 
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terminated before the onset of their pension were, in fact, due their 
pension benefits, as their employer was unjustly enriched by their 
work.225 In reference to stock options, Madsen notes that “the com-
pany has reaped the benefits of an employee’s hard work, creative 
ideas, and commitment. In return, the employee loses valuable stock 
options and does not get his or her part of the bargain.”226 Yet, Lucas 
is nevertheless predicated upon a breach of contract,227 which con-
stitutes a tangible wrong done by the company to the employees and 
is recognized by the court as requiring an equitable remedy for the 
company’s unjust enrichment.228 Moreover, although courts recog-
nize unjust enrichment among several other equitable remedies, 
there is also a longstanding predisposition to limit contractual inter-
pretation to the terms of the contract already agreed-upon by the 
parties.229 This is to say, unless specifically made illegal, as under 
federal antidiscrimination law, discriminatory firing and construc-
tive discharge are not, in and of themselves, tangible, actionable le-
gal wrongs. 
Regarding the integrity of contracts and how courts have histor-
ically held on issues related to stock options and other fringe em-
ployment benefits, Madsen highlights several cases where courts 
considered, in exceptional circumstances, the contracts granting eq-
uity or stock options to employees.230 One case in particular, Langer 
v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., could prove helpful to victims of dis-
crimination. In that case, the Eighth Circuit held that circumstances 
not contemplated within the bounds of the contract were not grounds 
 
 225 Madsen, supra note 215, at 232–33 (citing Lucas v. Segrave Corp., 277 F. 
Supp. 338, 338, 342 (D. Minn. 1967)). 
 226 See id. at 233. 
 227 Lucas, 277 F. Supp. at 344–45. 
 228 Madsen, supra note 215, at 232–33 (citing Lucas, 277 F. Supp. at 338, 
342). 
 229 See Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for 
Individual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 672 n.143, 
675–76 (2009) (citing Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 385 N.E.2d 566, 569 
(N.Y. 1978)) (“There exists an unavoidable tension between the concept of free-
dom of contract, which has long been basic to our socioeconomic system, and the 
equally fundamental belief that an enlightened society must to some extent protect 
its members from the potentially harsh effects of an unchecked free market sys-
tem.”). 
 230 Madsen, supra note 215, at 217–21. 
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for depriving the employee of their contractual right to stock op-
tions.231 In Langer, the court held the sale of the employer’s business 
to be an extraordinary circumstance not considered in the contract 
that granted options to the employee.232 Therefore, the plaintiff’s 
options were not “invalid,” as suggested by the defendant-employer 
upon the sale of their business.233 The case was reversed and re-
manded to lower courts for discernment of the damages due to the 
plaintiff in light of the Eighth Circuit’s findings.234 However, Oracle 
Corp. v. Falotti does note in an analysis of Langer that the Eighth 
Circuit, despite finding that the “plaintiff’s working for the defend-
ant for two years was ‘full consideration’ for his right to exercise his 
stock options”, limited Langer to already-vested options in a situa-
tion of termination without cause.235 While Oracle Corp. does sub-
sequently carve out instances of ADEA236 and Title VII237 antidis-
crimination as situations in which similar limitations to damages re-
covery, as in Langer, on “incrementally-vesting stock-option 
plan[s]” or the implementation of them do not apply, that analysis 
solely addresses federal antidiscrimination recourse.238 Citing 
Langer, among other cases, Williamson v. Moltech Corp. is poten-
tially helpful in interpreting stock option rights under wrongful ter-
mination more generally by stating that, “if the plaintiff’s employ-
ment had been wrongfully terminated, his stock option rights would 
not be terminated.”239 
Further, if a plaintiff-employee were able to successfully argue 
that, even if not covered by either federal or state antidiscrimination 
statutes, the extenuating circumstances of the pervasive 
 
 231 Langer v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 420 F.2d 365, 369 (1970); Madsen, su-
pra note 215, at 221. 
 232 Langer, 420 F.2d at 369; Madsen, supra note 215, at 221. 
 233 Langer, 420 F.2d at 367. 
 234 Id. at 369–70. 
 235 Oracle Corp. v. Falotti, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1202 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d, 
319 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 236 See Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 1237, 1243–44, 1247 (10th 
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defendant forced plaintiff to exercise his stock options upon termination in viola-
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 237 See Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 954–56 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 238 See Oracle Corp., 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.  
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discrimination that effectively caused their resignation were beyond 
the circumstances contemplated in the option contract, it is possible 
they could nevertheless have the contract terms construed in their 
favor. Madsen notes that “[i]n cases where the terms of the contract 
may be ambiguous, a court will consider the circumstances of the 
termination.”240 
This is, however, in steep contrast with Fredericks v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., where the court held that an end to the plaintiff’s em-
ployment also terminated the employee’s stock option rights, even 
if the termination was a resignation “induced . . . by humiliations 
and harassment.”241 There, the court distinguished Langer: “the 
plaintiff’s termination of employment . . . was neither unusual nor 
unforeseeable” in finding the contract unambiguous.242 Although 
the court readily acknowledged that a forced resignation is neither a 
traditional discharge nor a voluntary termination, the district court 
nonetheless found that the plaintiff could not recover damages for 
stock options unexercised as a result of the forced termination given 
that the defendant-employer had the “absolute right” per plaintiff’s 
employment contract to discharge the plaintiff-employee.243 The 
court went further to distinguish the harassment-forced resignation 
from a finding of bad-faith, as there had been in Gaines v. Monroe 
Calculating Machine Co., by noting that in Fredericks there was no 
unfounded breach of the employment contract.244 In short, not even 
 
 240 Madsen, supra note 215, at 221 (citing Fredericks v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1971)). 
 241 Fredericks, 331 F. Supp. at 422, 427–28.  
 242 Id. at 426. 
 243 See id. at 427 n.2, 28–31 (while court denied plaintiff’s first claim regard-
ing damages following defendant’s refusal to allow plaintiff to exercise stock op-
tions, plaintiff was permitted to explore damages to a trust that resulted from 
plaintiff’s firing.); see also Smith, supra note 16 (“Under the at-will doctrine, an 
employer may terminate an employee at any time, for any reason or for no reason. 
Precedents in California and Delaware, as well as other states, make it reasonably 
clear that it is permissible under the at-will employment doctrine to fire an em-
ployee because she became too expensive given the terms of her stock option 
plan.”). 
 244 See Fredericks, 311 F. Supp. at 426. 
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a resignation forced by harassment245 constituted bad faith such that 
it would implicate a breach of the employment contract sufficient to 
allow recovery for an employee with damages for stock options not 
exercisable as a result of that harassment-induced resignation.246 
The Fredericks holding illustrates a core tenet of contract law in 
that courts have a long-standing aversion to interfering with the 
“sanctity of the bargain,” or the terms of a mutually-agreed-upon 
contract, even if it erodes the equitable recompense due to victims 
of injustice.247 Equitable or other contract remedies such as promis-
sory estoppel, unconscionability, and the finding of a contract of ad-
hesion have fallen out of favor in courts in deference to protecting 
the “unfettered freedom of contract.”248 With specific reference to 
the bad faith distinguished in Fredericks, courts have a predilection 
for finding no erosion of good faith where the contract can be con-
strued as allowing such actions249—even if those actions are as se-
vere as effectively inducing a resignation.250 Professor Carolyn Ed-
wards of Marquette University Law School references Centerre 
Bank of Kansas City, N.A. v. Distrib’s, Inc.: 
The imposition of a good faith defense to the call for 
payment . . . transcends the performance or enforce-
ment of a contract and in fact adds a term to the 
agreement which the parties had not in-
cluded . . . . This court is not willing to rewrite the 
agreement . . . .251 
As with the equitable remedies referenced in Madsen’s analysis, 
some remedies may necessitate that a court find a breach of 
 
 245 See id. It is important to note that the harassment in Fredericks in no way 
suggests it was of a nature targeted towards any Title VII or otherwise federally 
or state-protected class. 
 246 See Fredericks, 311 F. Supp. at 427–31. 
 247 Edwards, supra note 229, at 675–76. 
 248 Id. at 652, 671–78. 
 249 Id. at 680. 
 250 See Fredericks, 311 F. Supp. at 427. 
 251 Edwards, supra note 229, at 680 n.181 (citing Centerre Bank of Kan. City, 
N.A. v. Distrib’s, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)). 
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contract252 or bad faith on behalf of the employer253—tangible of-
fenses for which courts are not then responsible for construing as an 
equitable remedy, often seen as “rewrit[ing] the agreement.”254 
However, this freedom and integrity of the contract is by itself 
questionable with contracts that contain an inordinate amount of eq-
uity compensation, as is typical in startups due to the notable lack of 
liquidity that is quintessential to the business model.255 Madsen al-
ludes to the concerning reality that many mid-level or legally-unso-
phisticated employees may not understand or contemplate the real-
ity of the potential forfeiture of this compensation in that they may 
not understand the increased complexities of equity-heavy compen-
sation agreements relative to cash.256 In suggesting that some equity 
compensation agreements may even be contracts of adhesion, 
wherein employees were proffered the contract in a manner that 
gave them no true bargaining power or choice, Madsen further ques-
tions the equity of courts applying wide stock option termination 
provisions when employees may not have had the sophistication or 
bargaining power to fully enter into such an agreement.257 
In short, avenues for recovery post-resignation under state and 
federal common law are constrained by rigid contract law frame-
works and a general lack of continuity in antidiscrimination laws 
that could protect employees in the absence of federal laws like Title 
VII and the ADEA. This can leave employees in a precarious posi-
tion: In the absence of federal laws, state laws, or common law 
breach of contract claims, employees lack the grounds to state a 
claim that is not purely seeking an equitable remedy at the discretion 
 
 252 Madsen, supra note 215, at 232 (citing Lucas v. Segrave Corp., 277 F. 
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of the courts. Moreover, given courts’ reluctance to award equitable 
remedies in such situations, these employees are even further 
harmed. 
C. State Law and Equitable Remedy in a Hypothetical 
Approach 
With reference to the Alex hypothetical, Alex potentially has far 
fewer avenues of recourse at a company of eleven employees than 
at a company of fifteen—and, regarding state antidiscrimination 
laws, their recourse would change geographically. Were Alex to 
work at a startup in California, for instance, Alex would be under 
the purview of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, 
which prevents discrimination on the basis of “race, religious creed, 
color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disabil-
ity, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gen-
der, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or 
military or veteran status of any person . . . .”258 This law further re-
quires that even employers with five or more employees provide 
sexual harassment training.259 In California, Alex could, therefore, 
follow a similar procedure to the recourse available under Title VII, 
bringing suit for constructive discharge on the basis of discrimina-
tion and their employer’s creation of a hostile workplace.260 How-
ever, given that the substantial majority of startup and related posi-
tions are outside of Silicon Valley,261 Alex could just as well be 
working at a startup anywhere in the nation and, therefore, be sub-
ject to the potentially lesser protection of a different state’s laws. 
Were Alex to work at a startup in Florida, for instance, Alex 
would not be able to successfully bring such a suit, as Florida’s Civil 
Rights Act of 1992 only extends antidiscrimination protection to 
workers at a place of employment with fifteen or more 
 
 258 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12940 (West 2019). 
 259 CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12950.1(h)(1) (West 2019). 
 260 See Thompson v. Tracor Flight Sys., Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95, 102–108 
(Ct. App. 2001) (noting that California state law cases on constructive discharge 
rest on the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law on the issue 
and upholding a successful constructive discharge claim in the midst of untenable 
working conditions). 
 261 See THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 349; The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is 
Coding, supra note 102. 
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employees.262 This is functionally no more protective than Title VII 
itself, and in fact, it requires dual filing with both Florida and the 
EEOC, which further complicates recourse with differing claim and 
deadline requirements.263 This would leave Alex to resort to civil 
equitable remedies, such as unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, 
or a finding of a contract of adhesion. However, as with Fredericks, 
given the reality that Alex was not fired but, instead, resigned, courts 
would likely be reluctant to find against the terms of the con-
tract264—even in the case of a harassment-induced resignation.265 
The tacit inability to bring a claim of discrimination, i.e., to pinpoint 
a tangible offense upon which Alex could predicate a claim in order 
to recover damages, results in an effective lack of recourse for em-
ployees in such situations. Put another way, it is easier for employ-
ees to prove that they have been wronged when a law is broken and 
damages can be proven outside of an equitable remedy at the discre-
tion of the court. For, as with Fredericks, under an equitable remedy 
theory, employees may not be entitled to recovery at all, no matter 
the gravity of their employers’ actions and the resulting injustice.266 
In summary, with cases of discrimination, a company with fewer 
than fifteen employees may not be held liable for discriminatory 
conduct that would be illegal at a company with fifteen or more em-
ployees.267 Failing federal law, state law, like California’s Fair 
 
 262 FLA. STAT. § 760.01–02(7)(2019); see EEOC Small Business Require-
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Employment and Housing Act,268 may be more protective than Title 
VII and the ADEA. In this case, employees are more protected than 
they would be under federal law alone. However, this protection is 
only as ironclad as each state’s own civil rights statues, and there is 
no universal grant of greater protection than that given by federal 
law.269 In states like Alabama270 and Georgia,271 for instance, there 
is no such enhanced protection. Protection may be, in fact, severely 
deficient relative to discriminatory offenses, given that Alabama en-
tirely lacks a state civil rights statute save that for prohibiting age 
discrimination.272 When an employee cannot find recourse under 
federal or state antidiscrimination law, they may find recourse in 
equitable remedies.273 However, as discussed in Fredericks,274 
courts may not positively construe such arguments in the event of a 
harassment-induced resignation. In short, without a ubiquitous, fed-
erally imposed grant of recourse, as available under Title VII, the 
ADEA or other federal antidiscrimination laws, employees in com-
panies with fewer than fifteen employees may have little legal re-
course if they resign due to a discriminatory work environment. 
While such employees may still be able to recover damages, that 
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ability is, at best, confounded by unequal state civil rights statutes 
and the somewhat mercurial discretion of the courts in granting eq-
uitable remedies. At worst, should protective state laws not apply 
and no equitable remedy be suitable, employees may not be able to 
recover whatsoever for their discrimination-induced termination 
and resultant economic injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
Startups span the nation275 as companies of varying shapes, 
sizes, and valuations.276 They are, by their very nature, boundary-
pushing, risk-taking, adolescent enterprises.277 And often, they are 
small. Or, at the very least, they begin that way. 
Every company has to start somewhere. Employees with an en-
trepreneurial spirit and a willingness to bind their fate to the com-
pany in the hopes of success make the deferred-payoff investment 
gamble. In doing so, they also bind themselves up in startup cul-
ture—a culture that is defined as much by hackathons and ping-pong 
as it is by a payment structure that seeks only those who are willing 
to sacrifice for the sake of the company’s future. As Professor Abra-
ham Cable from the University of California Hastings College of 
Law notes, “[E]mployee investors are both a cause of the mature 
startup and a significant risk-barer of the phenomenon.”278 And so, 
the iterative, boundary-breaking rush to “done” begins. 
But “done” is not perfect. Nor is it better when a startup becomes 
so entrenched in its own success that many employees suffer from 
the hostile workplace cultures that develop as a result.279 The United 
States has laws like Title VII, the ADEA, and the FLSA to hold em-
ployers accountable for the culture they create, perpetuate, or allow 
to exist. Except, to those startups under fifteen employees,280 these 
laws do not always apply—leaving in the balance state laws that 
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may or may not protect employees depending on the state’s civil 
rights statutes and equitable remedies that may or may not afford 
recovery if a court exercises its discretion to disallow damages. 
Antidiscrimination laws provide credibility to claims of harass-
ment or discriminatory behavior that effectively induce an employee 
to resign. Although the laws themselves, particularly federal, but 
also state, are critically important, what is perhaps more important 
in effect is the legal credibility afforded to victims. Moreover, when 
protected by these laws, victims of discrimination have a way of be-
ing legally heard. In other words, robust antidiscrimination laws 
give victims pathways to public recognition of the wrong and to a 
recovery of damages that are otherwise far more difficult, if not im-
possible, to obtain. Legal recognition of discrimination, even if by 
resignation and not termination,281 can provide a road to economic 
justice for victims in a calculable reckoning for what they lost as a 
result of workplace discrimination. 
That recognition, however, is not always available to victims. 
Even if the very same discriminatory behavior is perpetrated at dif-
ferent companies—one falling above and one below this fifteen-em-
ployee mark—only if the startup is at or above the minimum floor 
of fifteen employees will such ubiquitous, guaranteed protections 
against that discrimination apply to its employees.282 That is to say, 
it is not the discriminatory behavior itself that catalyzes protection 
for employees, but instead, the application of an antiquated and ar-
bitrary numeric cutoff does so.283 This current legal reality is unten-
able with most startups and related jobs spreading across the na-
tion,284 far from the prototypical and now-incomparable Silicon Val-
ley model lawmakers have come to recognize as the status quo.285 
Startups are as unique and variable286 as the problems their products 
and services aim to solve. Lawmakers must properly understand 
their unique practices in order to both help them innovate and pro-
tect those who foster that innovation. In short, “done” can never 
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become “perfect” if we forget those most vulnerable in and neces-
sary to getting it there. 
Law, like software, is not immutable. The framework of federal 
antidiscrimination law, state civil rights statutes, and discretionary 
equitable remedy is not, at present, entirely adaptable for the current 
“entrepreneurial renaissance.”287 Of several potential ways to rem-
edy this gap, one of the most critical and broad-spectrum solutions 
is the reimplementation of the OTA. 
Although Congress did not inherently task the OTA with ad-
dressing the issue of economic inequity resulting from discrimina-
tory cultural practices and equity compensation agreements, the 
OTA explored science, technology, and business with the end goal 
of creating well-informed policy on innovation.288 It was not limited 
to well-publicized inquiries of tech CEOs hauled before Con-
gress,289 and had a much broader spectrum of analysis to provide 
lawmakers with the information they needed to make knowledgea-
ble policy judgments.290 It follows that the OTA, while not directly 
tasked with analyzing issues of labor law, had far more potential 
than the current hearing-based model to provide lawmakers with a 
broad-spectrum assessment of issues spanning the fields of science, 
technology, and business. By focusing on enlightened policy, the 
OTA could provide far more comprehensive detail on the issues ac-
tually affecting the startups engaging in and driving innovation—
importantly including those beyond the size, location, and reach of 
Silicon Valley. The harassment described in this Note is just one of 
the issues at the crux of startup culture and the breaking or redefin-
ing of legal norms relative to their practices. Reestablishing the 
OTA’s advisory role in Congress could promote more sustainable 
and better-informed policy objectives simply because it has the po-
tential and the influence to shed light on issues that few, if anyone, 
think to analyze.291 The OTA, or an advisory office like it, would 
play a critical role in the iterative policymaking process necessary 
to address this ever-changing startup nation. 
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Further, and more specifically regarding federal antidiscrimina-
tion law, another potential solution is a legislative redefinition of the 
terms under which Title VII, the ADEA, and other like federal laws 
apply. As noted in Part III, unlike with Title VII, an employer’s vi-
olation of the ADEA is effectively seen as a violation of the FLSA 
in terms of damages.292 For victims of discrimination, this discrep-
ancy lies in an employee’s requirement to attempt to mitigate dam-
ages and court discretion over whether to award damages.293 Under 
Title VII, employees seeking recourse must attempt to mitigate and, 
subsequently, be awarded damages at the discretion of the court.294 
Under the ADEA, neither apply, in that a finding of an ADEA vio-
lation outright warrants damages tantamount to a violation of the 
FLSA.295 In terms of recovery for victims of discrimination, the 
FLSA standard could prove even more useful beyond merely 
providing more robust recovery standards under the ADEA. 
Moreover, being a law eponymously involving fair labor stand-
ards, and therefore wages, the FLSA governs companies under com-
merce-based standards,296 as opposed to the employee number re-
quirement standards for Title VII, the ADEA, and like federal anti-
discrimination laws.297 Under FLSA standards, companies of more 
than two employees that are engaged in at least $500,000 in sales 
per annum are under the purview of the FLSA.298 Importantly, even 
if the company itself does not meet these requirements, individuals 
are extended the protection of the FLSA if they are involved in or 
produce goods for interstate commerce.299 
There is no escaping the reality that startups are unique among 
businesses. They seek exponential growth and, in a sense, have an 
almost hydraulic effect—taking minimal cash, time, and human cap-
ital to produce something that, whether by hype or function, can be 
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orders of magnitude larger than the sum of its parts.300 The startup 
model is not one that is conducive to laws that govern any and every 
small business because a startup, even if small or young, can have a 
massively outsized effect on its people, product, market, and envi-
ronment. That is, in fact, somewhat the point. It follows that laws 
that do not contemplate the hydraulic nature of startups are not well-
suited for their culture or practices. Put another way, Title VII, the 
ADEA, and any like antidiscrimination law that has a minimum 
floor of applicability predicated upon a set number of employees 
may not be well-suited for companies, like startups, that, by their 
very nature, work to get the most output out of the least possible 
input in an effort to conserve already-scarce resources like human 
capital.301 
Were antidiscrimination protections under Title VII, the ADEA, 
and others to be applied on an FLSA-type commerce scale, however, 
that would likely be far more fitting to the hydraulic nature and ex-
ponential growth aims of startups. Given that a violation of the 
ADEA is, in terms of damages, already tantamount to a violation of 
the FLSA,302 there is an existing basis for likening, at least, certain 
elements of discrimination (here, that of discrimination based on 
age) to violations of wage and fair labor standards. Although un-
doubtedly not a perfect solution, as it would require situation-spe-
cific and drastic changes to the applicability of Title VII, the ADEA, 
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and other federal civil rights laws, it is, at least, closer to approxi-
mating antidiscrimination laws suitable for the startup business 
model. 
The issue of this effective vacuum space between federal anti-
discrimination laws, state civil rights laws, and equitable remedies 
is, inherently, one that arises out of a fundamental misunderstanding 
of how startups work. Issues that affect small or young startups may 
never see the light of a Congressional hearing with a CEO of a bil-
lion-dollar technology company. And lawmakers, in failing to have 
proper systems in place like the OTA to ensure that they are well-
informed on a broad spectrum of issues affecting science, technol-
ogy, and business, are prone to myopic focus on the Silicon Valley 
giants that produce such scandal and intrigue. This, combined with 
a startup culture that, by its contracts, hiring practices, and social 
morays, has proven to be vulnerable to abuses and erosions of em-
ployees’ rights, creates a situation in which an employee like Alex 
may never recover. 
Had Alex worked at the company for two more months, or one 
full year, Alex would be eligible to receive twenty-five percent of 
the stock options in the equity contract—the ability to purchase 500 
shares of the equity that Alex specifically sought in the hiring pro-
cess. Except, Alex worked there for ten months, or just over eighty 
percent of the year. Given the one-year cliff in the equity contract, 
it does not matter that Alex, by pro rata standards, worked to earn 
approximately 400 of the 500 shares. By resigning ten months into 
employment, Alex was due to receive nothing beyond a prorated 
cash salary. Again, had Alex worked at the startup for two more 
months, the ability to exercise the option to purchase 500 shares, or 
twenty-five percent of the equity promised, would have vested. 
However, for Alex, that would equate to two more months of har-
assment, stalking, and feeling unsafe at work every single day. 
Alex’s choice was, therefore, to suffer that discrimination, or to lose 
the equity compensation in its entirety, despite the ten months of 
work and hostile work environment that compelled Alex’s resigna-
tion. 
Extending the ubiquitous, nationwide protection of federal civil 
rights laws like Title VII and the ADEA to circumstances previously 
uncontemplated, such as this, would provide an avenue of recourse 
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to the growing base of employees in the ever-expanding startup in-
dustry. Startup-driven innovation will not and should not stop. It is 
a critical economic force that scholars, lawmakers, and other profes-
sionals alike must properly understand in order to create well-in-
formed policy that will promote such innovation without conveying 
untenable risk to the employees that are so critical in taking those 
innovative products and services to market. The law must come to 
acknowledge that the legal system has already been changed by 
these unique businesses, and it must quickly adapt to prevent further 
injustice. In short, the law must lead in striving for “perfect”—espe-
cially when most employers merely settle for “done.” 
